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ABSTRACT 
Worry and rumination are implicated in various disorders and are believed to contribute to 
the symptoms that create and maintain psychopathology.  The current critical review will 
examine worry and rumination in the context of depression, Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD), Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), and 
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD). The review will focus on these two types of repetitive negative 
thinking more specifically the (a) definition, (b) process, (c) theories, and (d) maintenance of 
psychopathology; as well as similarities and differences between these two processes.  A 
second emphasis will be on the importance of cultural considerations when treating 
individuals with emotional disorders.  A third focus of the analysis will be on the rationale, 
overview, and literature associated with a transdiagnostic treatment named the Unified 
Protocol for Transdiagnostic Treatment of Emotional Disorders (UP) . Finally, this review 
will conclude by highlighting futures research studies that can be implemented to improve upon 
the existing UP research.  
	
	
Keywords: Worry, Rumination, Anxiety, Depression, GAD, PTSD, OCD, SAD, Transdiagnostic, 
Culture, Unified protocol for transdiagnostic treatment of emotional disorders. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Repetitive thoughts, defined as “thinking attentively, repetitively, and/or frequently about 
oneself and one’s world” (Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 2003, p. 909),  
are ubiquitous, inescapable, and play an important function in peoples’ day-to-day lives and 
consequently their emotional and physical well-being (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; 
Segerstrom, et al., 2016; Segerstrom, Roach, Evans, Schipper, & Darville, 2010; Watkins, 2008). 
Repetitive thoughts and its impact on the individual can be further defined via how they present 
along the dimension of valence. Valence is defined as the emotional value associated with a 
stimulus, event, object, or situation, i.e., content (Segerstrom et al., 2003).  The value can be 
intrinsically attractive (positive valence) or aversive (negative valence) (Frijda, 1986). Examples 
of positively valenced repetitive thoughts include anticipation and reminiscing while negatively 
valenced repetitive thoughts include rumination, worry, and self-criticism  (Segerstrom et al., 
2016). The valence of repetitive thoughts is associated with concurrent affect and feelings of 
emotional and physical well-being (Segerstrom et al. 2003).  More specifically, individuals who 
experience repetitive thoughts with less negative content and are more positively valenced are 
likely to result in increased self-report of positive affect, less anxiety, better overall mental 
health, and fewer negative physical symptoms than individuals reporting repetitive thoughts with 
greater negative content (Beck, 1967; Segerstrom et al. 2003; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Moreover, 
an increase in negative affect and a decrease in motivation was self-reported by study 
participants who experience repetitive negative valenced thoughts (Beck, 1967; Martin, Tesser, 
& McIntosh, 1993). This paper will closely examine two specific types of negative valenced 
thoughts, worry and rumination; which are thought to be present in a number of psychological 
disorders and can greatly impact an individual’s functioning.  
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Definition of Rumination  
	
A review of the literature points to the difficulty in characterizing, measuring, and predicting 
the complex and multifaceted nature of the construct of rumination.   One oft-cited definition was 
developed by Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) who deﬁnes rumination as ‘‘behaviors and thoughts that 
passively focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms and on the implications of 
these symptoms’’ (p. 239). Another commonly found definition by Smith and Alloy (2009) 
proposes that rumination is a “stable, negative, broadly construed way of responding to 
discrepancies between current status and target status” (p. 126).  
Rumination is most often measured in research and clinical practice using the 
Ruminative Response Scale (Topper, Emmelkamp, Watkins, & Ehring, 2014). The Ruminative 
Response Scale was developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) as a 22-question self-
report Likert-scale questionnaire measuring how often an individual is focused on self, on 
symptoms, and on causes and consequences of their moods. A sample of the questionnaire can 
be found in Appendix A. Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003) further refined the 
Ruminative Response Scale by identifying a two-factor model of rumination.  After identifying 
12 questions within the scale as being depression related, i.e. more likely to be measures of 
depression than rumination, the remaining 10 questions were found to describe two aspects of 
rumination reflection and brooding.  The reflection questions on the measure reflect a looking 
inward to purposefully participate in problem-solving while brooding involves passively 
comparing one's current situation to an unachieved ideal (Treynor et al., 2003). 
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Definition of Worry 
	
Similar to rumination, worry is difficult to conceptualize, define, and assess; and there is a 
multitude of descriptions of worry.  One common and widely proffered definition is:  
A chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively 
uncontrollable; it represents an attempt to engage in mental problem-solving on an 
issue whose outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility of one or more 
negative outcomes; consequently, worry relates closely to the fear process. 
(Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983, p. 10)   
Another commonly found definition by Mathews (1990) proposes that worry is a cognitive 
process that is involved in maintaining feelings of anxiety and hypervigilence of threats or 
danger.  Almost all definitions share the commonality of identifying worry as future 
oriented, and having to do with concerns anticipating and preparing for future threats while 
avoiding negative affect and painful images (Dar & Iqbal, 2015; Yang et al., 2014; Watkins, 
Moulds, & McIntosh, 2005; McLaughlin, Borkovec & Sibrava, 2007; Borkovec, Hazlett-
Stevens, & Diaz, 1999).  
 The gold standard measure used to assess worry is the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire (Topper et al., 2014).  The Penn State Worry Questionnaire, a 16-item self-report 
measure, was developed by Meyer, Miller, Metzger, and Borkovec (1990) as a trait measure for 
worry.  The aim of the questionnaire is to assess the pervasiveness, intensity, and 
uncontrollability of worry (Molina & Borkovec, 1994).  A sample of the questionnaire can be 
found in Appendix B. 
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Worry, Rumination, and Psychopathology 
 
Regardless of the definitional difficulties with both concepts, most researchers and 
clinicians are likely to agree that worry and rumination are two types of repetitive, negative 
valenced, thought processes that account for some of the symptoms believed to create and 
maintain psychopathology. Worry and rumination are both thought to be unproductive cognitive 
thought processes that trigger negative emotions and maintain negative affect (Dar & Iqbal, 2015; de 
Jong-Meyer, Beck, & Riede, 2009; Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000; Yook, Kim, Suh, & 
Lee, 2010).  With regards to the latter, they are thought to be unproductive because they do not lead to 
active problem solving or behavioral changes (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008).  
These two types of negative valenced repetitive thoughts are known in research to be implicated in 
many disorders, including unipolar depressive disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), 
and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Kim, Yu, Lee, & Kim, 2012; van Oppen, Hoekstra, & 
Emmelkamp, 1995), social anxiety disorder  (SAD), and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
indicating that rumination and worry are transdiagnostic (Abbot & Rapee, 2004; Ehlers, Mayou, 
& Bryant, 1998).  
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In addition, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) 
implicates some of the processes of worry, rumination or both as diagnostic criteria in three 
disorders OCD, GAD, and PTSD, as illustrated in the table below.   
Table 1 
	
Worry and Rumination in OCD, GAD and PTSD 
Disorder Thought Disturbance 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder - 300.3 Recurrent and persistent thoughts, urges, or 
images that are experienced at some time 
during the disturbance, as intrusive and 
unwanted, and that in most individuals 
cause marked anxiety or distress. (In order 
to relieve distress from intrusive and 
repetitive worries, individuals engage in 
compulsions. Rumination is a common type 
of compulsion (McKay et. al, 2004)).   
Generalized Anxiety Disorder - 300.02 Excessive anxiety and worry (apprehensive 
expectation), occurring more days than not 
for at least 6 months, about a number of 
events or activities (such as work or school 
performance). 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder - 309.81 Persistent, distorted cognitions about the cause 
and or consequences of the traumatic event(s) 
that lead the individual to blame 
himself/herself or others. (The persistent and 
distorted cognitions manifest as rumination 
and worry (Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, 
Ruths, & Clark, 2007)). 
  
Even though the DSM-5 does not specifically mention worry or rumination as part of the 
diagnostic criteria for unipolar depression, and SAD, research points to the role these repetitive 
thoughts play in exacerbating symptomology associated with the disorders.  For example, worry 
and rumination are consistently assessed and endorsed in self-report measures (e.g. The 
Ruminative Response Scale, Responses to Stress Questionnaire, Impact of Events Scale, The 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire, The Worry Domains Questionnaire, and The Student Worry 
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Scale) of individuals diagnosed with two of the most common mental health disorders, Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD) and GAD, which have 12-month prevalence rates of 7% and 3.1% 
respectively (NIMH, 2015). In addition, these symptoms appear to contribute to the severity or 
chronicity of MDD, GAD, PTSD, OCD and SAD by exacerbating negative thinking, 
contributing to poor problem solving, depleting motivation to engage in goal-directed behavior, 
and reducing social support (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), underscoring the importance of 
addressing them in therapeutic interventions (Freeston, Ladouceur, Provencher, Blais, 1995;  
McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 2013; Michael, Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 2007; Watkins 
et al., 2005). Given their importance in the potential causal pathway, maintenance, and 
exacerbation of clinical symptoms; it will be important to examine rumination and worry more 
closely in the next chapters and how they are each thought to be implicated in specific 
diagnosable disorders.  
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Chapter II: Rumination 
Function of Rumination 
 There is a dearth of research on the function of rumination and theorists differ regarding 
rumination’s function.  Some theorists suggest that rumination functions as a maladaptive 
emotion regulation strategy (Smith & Alloy, 2009; Segerstrom, Roach, Ivans, Schipper, & 
Darville, 2010; Verduyn & Lavrijsen, 2015; Yook et al., 2010).  More specifically, individuals 
believe that engaging in ruminative thinking will result in a decrease in their negative emotional 
states.  
Other theorists posit that rumination is a control strategy. In an attempt to exert control 
over current life circumstances and create a sense of certainty, individuals may be prone to 
ruminate over a multitude of questions (Nolen-Hoesksema, 2000) such as “why did my life 
turnout this way?”; “Why have I not achieved my goals?” ; and “Why do I feel sad?” In search 
of the perfect answer to life questions or the need for excessive certainty of outcomes, ruminators 
experience difficulty settling on an answer and committing to a course of action.  The inability to 
find answers or choose a course of action results in the continued search for answers through 
rumination which self-perpetuates the act of rumination. The uncertainty generated by 
continuous questioning without finding a solution may, in turn, increase the levels of anxiety 
(Nolen-Hoesksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., 2008).   
A subset of researchers further propose that individuals who engage in rumination hold 
the positive belief that rumination will help them achieve their goals (Martin et al., 2004, 
Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001b; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). 
Therefore, individuals who ruminate are convinced that there are benefits to rumination and 
therefore continue to engage in this misshapen problem solving strategy. Notably, when 
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individuals in a dysphoric mood repetitively think about the causes of a personal problem, self-
reflect about a situation, or simply try to understand the consequences of their behavior, they 
erroneously believe they are engaging in a thinking process that helps them to reduce the 
discrepancies between their current situation and desired outcome, and effectively process 
information related to stress and trauma (Smith & Alloy, 2009; Wells, 2008; Wells & Matthews, 
1994).  In reality, rumination is often thought to increase the number of repetitive thoughts an 
individual has and consequently leads to prolonged, negative affective states (Mor & Winquist, 
2002; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008) and therefore likely to exacerbate or add to any pre-existing 
problems the individual was trying to solve in the first place.  
Although there is a lack of consensus about the exact function of rumination, whether it is 
primarily focused on negative affect reduction, a means of asserting control, or as a way to solve 
problems; rumination appears to play a significant role in creating, maintaining, or exacerbating 
unpleasant symptoms that may at some point rise to the level of a clinical disorder necessitating 
intervention. 
Rumination in the Context of Disorders  
	
  Rumination is associated with a number of psychological disorders, including depression, 
GAD, PTSD, OCD, and SAD. The characteristics of the ruminative process within these 
disorders is similar; specifically, repetitive, obsessive, and partially involuntary (Ehring & 
Watkins, 2008; Harvey et al., 2004); in that the ruminative thoughts is often described regardless 
of the specific disorder to “…recur in the absence of immediate environmental demands 
requiring the thoughts’’ (Martin & Tesser, 1996, p.7). Literature has shown interesting links 
between rumination and symptoms specifically associated with the diagnoses and presentation of 
different disorders; and some of these findings are discussed below. 
9	
	
 Rumination and depression. Research indicates a strong correlation between rumination 
and depression.  Studies have shown that individuals diagnosed with depression score higher on 
a measure of rumination than their non-depressed counterparts (Kimer al., 2012), and higher 
levels of rumination impact the onset, severity, and duration of depression (Just & Alloy, 1997; 
Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow & Fredrickson, 
1993; Rood, Roelofs, Bogels, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schouten, 2009).  Specifically, the likelihood 
of developing clinical depression is higher in individuals whose response to dysphoric moods is 
to ruminate (Rood et al., 2009).  Additionally, these individuals who responded to their 
depressed mood with rumination not only prolonged the duration of their depressive episode, but 
also intensified other negative feelings associated with the episode, including generation of and 
maintenance of hopelessness and worthlessness (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 1993). Conversely, depressed individuals who distracted themselves from their dysphoric 
moods by focusing on work and interacting with other people, which have the effect of also 
distracting these individuals from excessive rumination, experienced a less severe and shorter 
depressive episode and experienced less intense negative feelings (e.g., hopelessness, 
worthlessness)  (Just & Alloy, 1997 Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993). The 
findings seem to suggest that increased rumination leads to a prolonged and more severe 
depressive episode; while actions that inadvertently decrease rumination seem to lead to a more 
positive prognosis for depressed individuals. 
When reflecting on the literature, it seems possible that rumination often contributes to 
depressive symptomology and worsening depression over time because it leads to a recollection 
of negative memories from the past, negative interpretations of the present, and a more 
pessimistic outlook of the future (Koster, Lissnyder, Derakstan, & Raedt, 2011, Lyubomirsky, 
Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993,1995; Nolen-
10	
	
Hoeksema et al., 2008;  Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987; Watkins 2008). In this way, it 
seems to be an important mechanism in maintaining the negative triad as described by Beck; 
specifically, that negative thoughts about the self, others, and the world seem to create and 
maintain depressive symptomatology (Beck, 1979). Furthermore, rumination is ineffective as it 
rarely leads to a solution and therefore may lead to even more self-deprecating thoughts, 
decreased perception of self-efficacy and therefore increased hopelessness, and subsequently 
contribute to loss of interest and pleasure in most activities. Moreover, the negative outlook on 
the present time that is likely caused by excessive rumination can lead to social avoidance and 
isolation, a hallmark symptom of individuals diagnosed with depression, and factors that seem to 
contribute to the negative cycle of worsening depression symptoms.  Essentially, individuals 
with a negative outlook view both potentially beneficial solitary activities (e.g., running) and 
collective activities (e.g. going to a restaurant with friends) as distressing, uninteresting, or even 
pointless. Rumination may, therefore, directly contribute to the social avoidance behavior that 
maintains and worsens depressive symptoms in many individuals (Brockmeyer, Kulessa, 
Hautzinger, Bents & Backenstrass, 2015; Goldiamond & Dyrud, 1968). Although avoidance of 
potentially beneficial activities may provide short-term relief from distress, this type of 
withdrawal behavior leads to isolation and a lack of positive reinforcement from the environment 
in the long-term (Brockmeyer, et al., 2015; Jacobson, Martell & Dmidjian, 2001; Martell, Addis 
& Jacobson, 2001).  In addition, the avoidance behavior is negatively reinforced as a person with 
depression may continue to avoid uncomfortable situations because they learn that they not only 
obtain temporarily relief from not engaging in a potentially stress inducing activity; but that they  
have a mental activity (i.e. rumination) to keep their minds occupied instead. Over time, the 
behavior of rumination may become habitual, stable, and ingrained, sometimes persisting even  
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after a remission in major depressive symptomology (Hong, 2006; Bagby, Rector, Bacchiochi, & 
McBride, 2004), which then present as a significant risk factor for future depressive episodes.  
Given that empirical research suggests that rumination increases the intensity and 
duration of depression and therefore may prolong suffering in afflicted individuals, it is 
interesting to investigate the reasons for why individuals continue to engage in such maladaptive 
thought processes.  Fascinatingly, multiple studies on rumination suggest that depressed 
individuals endorse very positive beliefs about their practice of ruminating, significantly more 
than their never-depressed counterparts (Lyubomisky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Papageorgiou 
& Wells, 1999; Watkins & Moulds, 2005).  For instance, individuals who ruminate about their 
mood (e.g., “Why am I sad?” “What did I do wrong?” “Will I always be this way?”) inaccurately 
believed they were enhancing their self-understanding or insight of their negative emotional state 
(Lyubomisky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). Researchers also found that people with depression 
believed rumination increased their self-awareness and their understanding of clinical depression 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2009; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001).  Ironically, and as discussed in the 
earlier section, those who ruminate most often believe they are engaging in a formidable process 
of problem solving, when in actuality the processes are playing a significant role in maintaining 
their depressive symptoms and potentially leading to further problems in the social, occupational, 
or other important domains of functioning.  It appears that the belief that rumination is a positive 
strategy, adopted by more depressed than non-depressed individuals, is an important explanation 
for why depressed individuals continue to engage in this process even though through the eyes of 
a professional or loved one it is contributing to a worse prognosis.  
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In addition to the strong association between rumination with depressive 
symptomatology, the literature also implicates rumination in anxiety disorders. The subsequent 
section will discuss the implications of how rumination presents in GAD, PTSD, OCD, and 
SAD.  
Rumination and generalized anxiety disorder. Few researchers have specifically 
studied rumination as expressed in individuals with GAD.  However, similar to individuals with 
depression, individuals with high levels of anxiety, one of the central criteria of GAD, were also 
found to score highly on measures of rumination (Legerstee, Garnesfski, Verhulst, & Utens, 
2011). Some of the existing research findings posit that individuals diagnosed with GAD 
ruminated more frequently, as measured by the Ruminative Response Scale, than their non-
anxious counterparts (Decker, Turk, Hess, & Murray, 2008; Kim et al., 2012).   More 
specifically, researchers found two subcomponents of rumination, brooding and reflection 
(Treynor et al., 2003; Watkins, 2009). The studies showed that the brooding component of 
rumination, defined as passively comparing one's current situation to an unachieved ideal, was 
directly related to GAD while the reflection component of rumination, looking inward to 
purposefully participate in problem-solving, was not.  Adding to the importance of examining 
the subcomponents of rumination, research suggests that individuals diagnosed with GAD who 
were more likely to engage in the subcomponent process of brooding were found to have  
increased levels of anxiety in comparison to individuals with GAD who did not often engage in  
brooding (Starr & Davila, 2012). With respect to GAD, it appears that the subcomponent process 
of brooding appears to be especially closely related to the development and maintenance of 
GAD. 
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Rumination and posttraumatic stress disorder. Many researchers suggest that 
rumination is a predictor of persistent PTSD, and that specifically rumination about the traumatic 
event or events is the key process that maintains PTSD symptomology (Clohessy and Ehlers, 
1999; Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998; Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002; Steil and Ehlers, 2000). 
Specifically, rumination that focuses attention on the causes and consequences of the traumatic 
event (both aspects that are largely uncontrollable, or at least perceived as such by the victim of 
trauma) instead of the actual events associated with the trauma (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers & 
Steil, 1995) seem to interferes with effective and therapeutic emotional processing of the event  
(Foa & Kozak, 1986) leading to the maintenance of PTSD symptomology.  Instead of focusing 
attention on the actual, more objective events of the traumatic experience, individuals clinically 
diagnosed with PTSD ruminate on the “whys” and “what ifs,” potentially (as posited by some 
researchers) as a strategy to avoid experiencing the emotions associated with the trauma 
(Michael, Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 2007).  With regards to this hypothesis, rumination may 
allow the individual to avoid internal stimuli such as negative feelings and traumatic memories 
and external stimuli generated by the environment that might remind the individual of the 
traumatic event or events.  A consequence of avoiding external stimuli is that the individual is 
likely to avoid social interaction entirely, even those that might net positive effects on the 
individual’s mood or outlook. Specifically, investigators posit that successful emotional 
processing and change occur when the original trauma-related emotions are activated within new 
environments or experiences (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Teasdale 1999) that are potentially rewarding 
and not traumatic.  In contrast, dwelling on the causes of the trauma via ruminative thoughts 
instead of proactively engaging with the environment is likely to maintain PTSD 
symptomatology and specifically drive the belief that the world is not a safe place.   
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In summary, similar to the avoidance function rumination plays in depression, rumination 
within the context of individuals with PTSD symptoms seem to serves as an avoidance strategy 
of the more effective processing of traumatic memories (Ehlers et al., 1998; Michael et al., 2007) 
which would hasten their recovery from PTSD.  Even though avoidance provides temporary 
relief, in the long term avoidance leads to re-experiencing of the trauma and increased negative 
mood states (Ehlers et al., 1998; Michael et al., 2007). The negative emotions triggered by 
rumination increase intrusive traumatic memories leading to a ruminative cycle (Michael et al. 
2007) possibly even leading to the development or the exacerbation of any comorbid diagnoses.  
Rumination and obsessive compulsive disorder. In addition to depression, GAD, and 
PTSD, rumination is implicated in OCD and is positively correlated with obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms (Wahl, Ertle, Bohne, Zurowski, & Kordon, 2011).  Rumination as it affects 
individuals with OCD is generally referred to as a ruminative thinking style and is defined as  ‘‘a 
mode of responding to distress that involves repetitively and passively focusing on symptoms of 
distress and the possible causes and consequences of these symptoms’’ (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2008, 
p. 400). The passive focus refers to individuals with OCD who are ruminating having a 
propensity to fixate on the problems and on their feelings about the problems without mobilizing 
to action (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2008). Wells (2009) proposed a metacognitive model of OCD, 
postulating that a ruminative thinking style is in part responsible for the maintenance of the 
disorder. Specifically as rumination relates to individuals with OCD symptoms, the mental ritual 
appears to combine review and checking by first mentally replaying an event that did take place, 
and then adding a hypothetical element of the event that could have but did not take place.  
Individuals engaging in this repetitive thought process of rumination would then proceed to 
analyze how they would have behaved if the hypothetical feared scenario did take place.  The 
ritual of analyzing a feared hypothetical situation and determining how one would appropriately 
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respond in the situation gives the individual a sense of hope that they can manage the situation 
(Herschfield, 2013) if it were to ever come to fruition. Extant research establishes a clear link 
between rumination and OCD. Wahl et al. (2011) found correlations between depressive 
ruminative thinking, obsessive rumination (defined as a ‘‘ voluntary, effortful cognitive or 
behavioral act’’ (Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997, p. 344)), and obsessive-compulsive (OC) 
symptom severity. The results indicated that higher levels of ruminative thinking to distressing 
situations resulted in greater obsessive ruminations and subsequently greater obsessive-
compulsive symptom severity.  
Similar to rumination’s role in other anxiety disorders discussed so far, rumination may 
initially reduce feelings of anxiety while in the long run increase symptoms through negative 
reinforcement (Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997; Freeston et al., 1995; Wahl et al., 2011). 
Rumination appears to exacerbate and maintain OCD symptomology since it functions as an 
obstacle to decision-making, and indecision is specifically implicated in the pathological 
symptomology of OCD. People make countless decisions on any given day; some decisions are 
automatic, and others require thought and analysis. An important goal regarding decision making 
is to try to maximize positive outcomes as much as possible and to do so expediently, therefore 
reducing cognitive load; as indecisiveness is an uncomfortable state for human beings and 
contribute to decision fatigue which leads to a number of deleterious effects including negative 
impact on emotional states, heightened impulsivity, and ultimately, poorer overall efficiency and 
effectiveness in the work environment and other important life domains (Polman & Vohs, 2016; 
Vohs et al., 2008) Compulsive individuals have difficulties making decisions efficiently, and as 
such decisions are often delayed or avoided, leading individuals to ruminate instead of engaging 
in action (Sachdev & Malhi, 2005), which appear to have the effect of leading to further delay 
and avoidance of making decisions and increases emotional distress for the individual.  
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Rumination and social anxiety disorder. Although rumination is not explicitly listed as a 
criterion of SAD in the DSM-5, research posits that rumination is a factor in the maintenance of 
SAD (Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Clark & Wells, 1995; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). According to investigators, individuals diagnosed with SAD ruminate by 
reviewing social interactions in great detail and attributing to them a negative valence (Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Mellings & Alden, 2000), particularly with regards to their own actions or the 
perceptions of their actions by others.  More specifically, individuals diagnosed with SAD 
engage in a specific subtype of rumination that is largely related to social interactions known as 
post-event processing, a “period of reflection on actual or perceived inadequacies, mistakes, 
imperfections, and the like. . .  and is ruminative in nature” (Kocovski, Endler, Rector, & Flett, 
2005, p. 972). Individuals with SAD tend to focus specifically upon negative self-focused 
information that maintains preexisting negative cognitive biases about themselves and the world 
(Melling & Alden, 2000). Post-event processing leads to strong encoding of their interpretation 
of the experience into memory, which results in the individual recalling the experience more 
negatively than it actually was (Abbot & Rappee, 2004; Clark & Wells, 1995; Dannahy& Stopa, 
2007; Edwards, Rapee & Franklin, 2003; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) 
and has direct consequences on how the individual might approach similar social situations in the 
future, likely in self-sabotaging or self-effacing ways that increase the likelihood of eliciting their 
feared responses of rejection from others. Specifically, the process of post-event processing 
results in anticipatory processing prior to the next social engagement leading an individual to 
recall all the negative details of their performance in the previous social engagement and to 
attribute the same negative outcomes to the future social event (Mellings & Alden, 2000;  
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Rachman, Gruter-Andrew, & Shafran, 2000). In summary, post-event processing, a specific  
subtype of rumination, are more likely used by individuals with SAD compared to individuals 
without SAD, and post-event processing functioned to maintain social anxiety symptoms 
(Krocovski, Endler, Rectov, and Flett 2005).  
Summary of Rumination in the Context of Disorders  
	
In conclusion, individuals who ruminate appear to primarily use it for one or more of the 
following functions: (a) gain a sense of control, (b) regulation of emotions including the 
reduction of negative emotions and the avoidance of painful feelings, and (c) achieve goals. 
Therefore, individuals who ruminate believe that there is a positive effect of this technique, 
leading them to increasingly engage in it, often at their own detriment. It is possible individuals 
who tend to ruminate have not made this explicit connection between their tendency to ruminate 
and the development, maintenance, and even exacerbation of their emotional symptomatology; 
or the connection between rumination and problems functioning effectively in various life 
domains.   
Worry, a different form of repetitive, negative valenced thought process, will be 
described in more detail in the subsequent section. Similar to the examination on Rumination, the 
discussion will include a more developed description of the process and its role in various 
clinical disorders.  
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Chapter III: Worry 
Function of Worry 
Worry is defined as a verbal and linguistic process that allows individuals to avoid 
vivid and painful imagery, thus reducing negative affect and biological responses 
(Borkovec, Ray, Stober, 1998). The cognitive aspect of worry increases verbal thought and 
decreases imaginal thought (a mode of thinking that consists of images that one can see, 
hear or feel in the mind and is the primary trigger for emotional activation; Borkovec & Inz 
1990). Worry appears to be elicited by an environmental or imaginal fear stimulus that 
triggers mental problem solving to prevent the feared event from occurring and/or to 
identify coping strategies for such events (Borkovec et al., 1983; Borkovec & Roemer, 
1995).  Thus, worrying can be adaptive, helping individuals to anticipate, prepare, and 
handle future dangers.   
In contrast, worrying is considered maladaptive when there is no actual threat and the 
danger is imaginal. Paradoxically, the lack of threat and danger may perpetuate excessive 
worrying in some individuals. When the unlikely threat does not manifest, worry is 
reinforced by the lack of occurrence of the situation that was perceived to be threatening, 
leading to an increase in responding to perceived threats with worry (Borkovec, Alcaine & 
Behare, 2004). Individuals describe excessive worrying as intrusive concerns or thoughts 
recurring throughout their days (Gladstone & Parker, 2003). Furthermore, worry is 
conceptualized to be pathological when it is:  
Excessive, out of proportion to the actual problem, pervasive, present most of the time, 
focused on several themes or topics (typically those that pertain to ‘‘everyday routine life  
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circumstances’’, ‘‘minor matters’’, or both), uncontrollable, and with a tendency to 
interfere with functioning and cause high levels of distress and impairment (Starcevic et al., 
2007). 
Habitual worrying negatively impacts both physical and mental health (Brosschot, 
Verkuil, Thayer, 2016). For example chronic worrying has been associated with a two to seven 
time increased risk for cardiovascular disease (Tully, Cosh & Baune, 2013). With regards to 
mental health, persistent worrying is a central causal factor in chronic anxiety and the default 
response to uncertainty (Brosschot, Gerin, Thayer, 2006). Consistent responding to situations 
and events with excessive worry also disrupts an individual’s ability to concentrate and 
engage effectively in other behaviors (Matthews, 1990). Lang (1988) found that verbal 
presentation of fear material produced less cardiovascular response than imaginal presentation of 
the same material.  Combining these areas of research suggests that imagery activates somatic 
emotional experiencing and the linguistic nature of worry interferes with emotional processing 
(Borkovec, Lyonfields, Wiser, Diehl, 1993; Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986) thereby, 
increasing worrying through negative reinforcement (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Borkovec et al., 
1993; Hoehn-Saric & McLeod, 1990).   
 In addition to worry’s impact on concentration, worry is implicated in control beliefs and 
avoidance of negative affect. Some individuals who excessively worry believe that they 
should be able to control events, that the uncertainty associated with the lack of control is 
intolerable, and that worry will aid in the effort to help them gain a sense of control (Dugas, 
Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998; Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). 
Other individuals utilize worry, albeit unconsciously to some degree, in order to avoid  
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confronting negative affect and aversive images (Borkovec et al., 2004; Roemer, Salters,  
Raffa, & Orsillo, 2005). Therefore, individuals who consistently worry derive some perceived 
benefits from this process, which makes it more difficult to distinguish this behavior.  
Worry in the Context of Disorders    
	
Worry is implicated in a number of psychological disorders, including depression, GAD, 
PTSD, OCD, and SAD.  
Worry and depression.   Worry in the context of depression is experienced as a 
predominance of thoughts and not as images (Molina et al., 1998). Two main occurrences result 
when individuals shift from a neutral state to one of pathological worry:  a decrease of focus on 
the present moment and immediate environment, and an increase in cognitive distortions in the 
form of absolute words (e.g., always, never), catastrophic words (e.g., awful, terrible, 
horrible…) and the use of rules and commands (e.g., should and have to statements; Ingram & 
Kendall, 1987; Molina et al., 1998; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992). 
Researchers that have examined the relationship between depression and worry indicate 
that excessive worry is highly correlated with depression (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Molina, 
Borkovec, Peasley & Person, 1998; Segerstrom et al., 2000; Starcevic, 1995). Individuals 
diagnosed with depression were also found to self-endorse high levels of worry on the Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ)  (McEvoy et al., 2013; Segerstrom et al., 2000).  Furthermore, in 
self-report measures, individuals diagnosed with depression were found to endorse with high 
frequency the use of the word worry in describing their thoughts (Nolen-Hoeksema & Mororw, 
1993). Further, individuals who endorse higher levels of worry also experience sadness, fear,  
irritability, and poor self-worth (Kalmbach, Pillai, & Ciesla, 2016); which suggests that there is  
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at least a correlative relationship amongst these factors, if not a partially causal one from worry 
to other symptoms associated with depression. 
Worry and generalized anxiety disorder. Worry is thought to be the central defining 
feature of GAD (Barlow, Blanchard, Vermilyea, Vermilyea, & DiNardo, 1986; Dar & Iqbal, 
2015; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubormiski, 2008; Yang et al., 2014). Worry in GAD is 
believed to be a predominance of thought activity, which precludes processing negative 
emotions (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behr, 2004; Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Newman & Llera, 
2011).  The existence of increased thought activity which might suggest excessive worry 
processes in GAD was supported by electroencephalography data showing increases in left 
frontal cortical activation (Borkovec, Ray & Stober, 1998; Carter, Johnson, & Borkovec, 
1986; Heller. Nitschke, Etienne, & Miller, 1997).  
  When asked why they worry, individuals diagnosed with GAD indicated that 
worrying helps to distract them from emotions (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Freeston et al., 
1994), particularly painful or negative ones. Individuals with GAD seem to dislike the direct 
experience of emotions. In several studies, individuals with GAD reported greater 
discomfort and fear of the negative consequences of experiencing emotions than did their 
non-worrying counterparts  (Llera & Newman, 2010; Mennin et al., 2005; Roemer et al., 
2005; Turk, Heimberg, Luterek, Mennin, & Fresco, 2005). Unfortunately, the routine 
avoidance of processing negative emotions consequently exacerbates distress as symptoms 
may reappear in more severe forms, express themselves in bodily ills and pains, and inhibit 
the learning and practice of effective emotional processing skills (Decker, Turk, Hess, 
Murray, 2008). Some research also suggests that individuals with GAD have difficulty with 
the intolerance of uncertainty; and excessive worrying seems to help patients believe they 
are establishing a degree of control over their circumstances. Patients may believe that  
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through worrying, they are actively attempting to find a solution and prevent potential 
negative outcomes (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur & Freeston, 1998; Mogg et al., 1991; 
Metzger, Miller, Cohen, Sofka, & Brokovec, 1990).   
Subjects diagnosed with GAD seem to derive some perceived benefits from 
excessive worry. For example, individuals with GAD cited  (a) motivation to get 
responsibilities accomplished, (b) preparation for negative outcomes, (c) avoidance of 
potential bad events, (d) help with problem solving, (e) distraction from aversive emotions, 
and (f) superstitious positive impact on future events (Davey, Hampton, Farrel & Davidson, 
1992). Individuals particularly seem to ascribe to the benefits of motivation, preparation for 
the worst outcome, and avoidance of feared events (Brokovec & Roemer, 1995).  
Worry and posttraumatic stress disorder.  Existing studies have established a link 
PTSD symptomology and worry (Roussis & Wells, 2006; Scarpa, Wilson, Wells, Patriquin & 
Tanaka; 2009).  Given the highly aversive internal experiences associated with PTSD, patients 
are likely to engage in emotional avoidance behavior through worry (Tull, Hahn, Evans, Salters-
Pedneault, & Gratz, 2011).  Their motivation to worry appears to be directly related to the 
intensity of the aversive internal experiences or emotional dysregulation (Marx & Sloan, 2002; 
Mennin et al., 2005; Tull, Gratz, Salters, & Roemer, 2004). 
In PTSD patients, worry appears to increase attention to perceived threat (leading to 
symptoms such as hypervigilance) while reducing cognitive resources which are needed for 
processing traumatic events which may make it more difficult for them to experience symptom 
remission over time (Bardeen & Fergus, & Wu, 2013; Newman & Llera, 2011). Increased 
attention to perceived threat leads to a vicious cycle as it creates further attentional bias toward 
negative stimuli or perceived environmental threats, which lead to even more frequent worrying 
(Hirsch et al., 2011).  Similar to how worry operates for individuals with GAD, the worry 
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process in PTSD is also associated with intolerance of uncertainty (Bardeen et al., 2013). 
Further, the purpose of worry in PTSD does not seem focused on reducing negative emotions; 
rather, to maintain a constant emotional state even if that state is unpleasant (Bardeen, et al., 
2013).  Underlying this particular worry function is the belief by many individuals with PTSD 
that they lack the ability to regulate emotions and some studies do show that individuals who 
endorsed a high number of PTSD symptoms were less effective at emotion regulation (Tull, 
Barrett, McMillan, & Roemer, 2007); therefore, a constant unpleasant emotional state is 
preferable to fluctuating emotional states (Newman & Llera, 2011).  
Worry and obsessive compulsive disorder.  Worry in OCD is viewed as a thought 
control strategy (defined as action taken to attempt to rid oneself of distressing thoughts; Clark, 
2004) and is heavily implicated in the development and maintenance of OCD symptomology 
(Fergus & Wu, 2010; McKay & Greisberg, 2002). In actuality, the frequent use of thought 
control strategies greatly impede emotional processing of the thought (Foa & Kozack, 1986) and 
bring the thought further into consciousness (Clark, 2004), which can be very distressing for the 
individual.  In addition, worry was found to interact with co-occurring obsessive beliefs or 
obsessions (defined as ego-dystonic persistent thoughts and images (Horwath & Weissman, 
2000), which inadvertently leads to greater number, frequency, and severity of thought 
intrusions.  In addition, similar to worry’s function in GAD and PTSD, both worry and 
obsessions occur with greater frequency and are associated with stronger perceptions of 
uncontrollability in clinical populations than in nonclinical groups. Both worry and obsessions 
are also associated with adverse mood, which is related to attentional biases toward anxiety-
related or depression-related information (van Rijsoort, Emmelkamp, Vervaeke, 2001). These  
findings suggest that worry and the co-occurrence of obsessions in OCD might perpetuate or  
 
24	
	
intensify OCD symptoms and make maladaptive behaviors (such as compulsions) taken as a way 
to attempt to alleviate the increased anxiety state more difficult to extinguish. 
Worry and social anxiety disorder. Worry has been implicated in the maintenance of 
SAD symptomology (Hearn, Donovan, Spence & March, 2017).  Individuals with SAD were 
found to score higher in intensity and frequency of worry than their nonclinical counterparts, 
which may suggest that worry is a maintaining or even causal factor in the disorder (Hearn et al., 
2017; Starcevic et al., 2007).   Some theorists believe the function of worry within SAD is 
similar to the function of worry in GAD and PTSD in that it allows an individual to avoid 
uncomfortable emotions (Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Edwards, Rapee, & 
Franklin, 2003; Rachman et al., 2000; Wells & Carter, 2002). The process of avoiding 
uncomfortable emotions by worrying is thought to generalize to and exacerbate the avoidance of 
a multitude of social interactions and performance situations (Hofmann, 2007). Other theorists 
believe that individuals worry as a preparatory mechanism, so that they can rehearse aspects of 
the social interaction to increase their feelings preparedness and control (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Kashdan & Roberts, 2007; Klemanski, Curtis, McLaughlin, Nolen-Hoeksema, 2016). However, 
in individuals with SAD, this seems to have the opposite function and makes them feel ill-
prepared, ill-at-ease, leading them to avoid the situation completely or to self-sabotage their 
“performance” due to their heightened anxiety state. 
Summary of Worry in the Context of Disorders  
	
In conclusion, individuals who worry appear to primarily use it for one or more of the 
following functions, two of which are similar to the reasons individuals engage in rumination: (a) 
gain a sense of control, (b) regulation of emotions including the reduction of negative emotions 
and the avoidance of painful feelings, and (c) as a response to heightened intolerance of 
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ambiguity. Similar to rumination, individuals who worry believe that there is a positive effect of 
this technique, leading them to increasingly engage in it along with other co-occurring behaviors 
to mitigate their distress, which makes it difficult for these behaviors to be extinguished 
especially with the passage of time (Kircanski et al., 2015). It is possible individuals who tend to 
worry are more focused on the perceived benefits of worrying rather than its consequences; and 
have adopted this as a consistent coping strategy as a way to temporarily feel better about certain 
situations and circumstances. However, over time, individuals who excessively worry tend to 
have poorer physical and mental health, and have great difficulty functioning effectively in 
various life domains.   
The previous discussion appears to shed light on the vast similarities between worry and 
rumination in terms of their function and effects across various disorders (Kircanski et al., 2015; 
McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 2013). In fact, an active debate exists regarding whether 
rumination and worry are the same or separate processes. Therefore, the theoretical and clinical 
delineations of both concepts need more clarification. The nature of worry and rumination 
suggests that these processes overlap with and differ from each other in important ways. To 
further elucidate these two concepts, a more expansive discussion to enhance understanding of 
these concepts follows. First, the primary differences between worry and rumination are 
discussed. Second, the similarities between worry and rumination will be reviewed. Third, the 
clinical implication of the substantial overlap of rumination and worrisome thoughts will be 
described. Finally, the importance of targeting rumination and worry as part of a transdiagnostic 
treatment approach are explored.    
  
26	
Chapter IV: Worry and Rumination 
Differences between Worry and Rumination 
Historically, the symptom of worry was studied in the context of anxiety disorders and 
the symptom of rumination was studied in the context of depressive disorders (Ehring & 
Watkins, 2008; Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, & Heimberg, 2002). Some research posits that worry 
and rumination may retain distinct components, which predict anxious and depressive symptoms 
differentially within and across time (Ehring & Watson, 2008; Hong, 2007). 
In comparison to rumination, worry emerged as the dominant cognitive vulnerability 
factor typically seen in anxiety disorder presentations that predicted increases in symptoms over 
time (Hong, 2007). Conversely, rumination uniquely predicted higher disengagement from 
problems, which resulted in further exacerbation of depressive mood (Hong, 2007). These results 
demonstrated not only the distinct features of worry and rumination on coping behavior, but also 
the different coping pathways by which they differentially impact on subsequent symptoms. 
Further, worry is believed to be future-focused and more associated with feelings of anxiety 
while rumination is thought to be past-oriented and more associated with feelings of depression 
(Borkovec et al., 2004; Ehring & Watson, 2008; Fresco et al., 2002; McLaughlin et al., 2007; 
Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Furthermore, the study participants were able to distinguish worry 
and rumination based on the temporal-orientation of the thoughts, past or present, and whether 
the focus was internal/on the self or external/on the environment (Kircanski et al., 2015). The 
above findings may have led to worry to be named a trademark feature of GAD  (GAD;  
American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and a feature of all anxiety disorders (Barlow, 2008), 
while rumination has become prevalently featured as a marker of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2004).  
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In summary, worry and rumination are experienced differently by an individual, 
specifically with regards to temporal orientation past versus present, with regards to focus 
internal versus external, and the impact on coping behavior, perception versus avoidance of 
problems. Historically, these two concepts have been studied somewhat separately; however, a 
large growing body of literature is beginning to examine these factors as interrelated processes 
that present as symptoms across a number of clinical conditions. 
Similarities between Worry and Rumination 
	
 Worry and rumination have been studied as related and overlapping processes in recent 
literature. For example, both worry and rumination are classified in the literature as Repetitive 
Negative Thinking (RNT). RNT are unproductive and repetitive thought processes that function 
to maintain and increase negative affective states (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Sergestrom et al., 
2000; Watkins, 2008). Moreover, whereas persistent brooding about a problem (rumination) is 
traditionally known to be a prominent feature of major depressive disorder (MDD), while worry 
is more strongly associated with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), recent research suggests 
RNT increases vulnerability to multiple anxiety and depressive disorders and, as a common risk 
factor, elevated RNT may account for the high levels of comorbidity observed between 
emotional disorders (McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 2013). Interestingly, some research 
indicates that both worry and rumination are verbal, linguistic, and associated with an 
individual’s positive and negative meta-cognitive beliefs about their function. For example, an 
individual may believe the function of a negative or positive thought is essential in order to 
achieve a certain goal (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Fresco et al., 2002).  Segerstrom et al. (2000) 
found that both worry and rumination significantly correlated with a measure of repetitive 
thinking, leading them to propose that while thought content and goal orientation could 
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discriminate between anxious worry and depressive rumination, thought process might not 
discriminate between them. In fact, the literature reveals three shared qualities of the thinking 
processes underlying worry and rumination. Firstly, thought processes are considered to be 
repetitive; secondly, thought processes are difficult to control; and thirdly, thought processes are 
focused on negative content (Borkovec et al., 1983; Kashdan & Roberts, 2007; Michael et al., 
2007; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Further, it appears that uncontrollable levels of repetitive 
negative thinking are present across a large range of clinical disorders and appear to be causally 
involved in the maintenance of emotional problems (Borkovec et al., 1983).  As direct 
comparisons of repetitive negative thinking between different disorders (e.g., GAD–type worry 
and depressive rumination) have generally revealed more similarities than differences, it is thus 
argued that repetitive negative thinking is characterized by the same process across disorders, 
which is applied to a disorder–specific content (Segerstrom et al., 2000). Additionally RNT in 
the form of worry and rumination were further found to impact the quality of the daily lives of 
individuals prone to these processes. For example, participants in one study experienced both 
worry and rumination as highly unpleasant, repetitive, and uncontrollable (Kircanski et al., 
2015). Other examples of RNT as cited by Watkins (2008) include “1) Perseverative cognition, 
2) Emotional processing, 3) Cognitive processing, 4) Mental simulation, 5) Rehearsal, 6) 
Reflection, and 7) Problem solving” (p.163). Watkins (2008) review of the literature consolidates 
the unconstructive consequences of RNT into “(a) Vulnerability to depression, (b) Vulnerability 
to anxiety, and (c) Difficulties in physical health.” (p.166). Thus, RNT is known to be a 
transdiagnostic process as it is not disorder specific; and furthermore, the extant literature 
appears to suggest that the symptoms of worry and rumination greatly overlap in their 
presentation, and delineations between the two concepts are not always clear.  
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Moving toward a Transdiagnostic Theory 
	
The historically accepted idea that worry is often associated with anxiety and rumination 
is often associated with depression is being challenged by recent literature. According to Moffit 
et al. (2007), rumination is a significant mediator in the prospective associations of anxiety 
symptoms with subsequent depression and of depressive symptoms with subsequent anxiety. 
Further, abundant evidence documents strong temporal relationships between symptoms of 
anxiety and depression and high levels of successive comorbidity between major depression and 
anxiety disorders (Moffit et al., 2007). Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker and Larson (1994) suggest that 
ruminative responses to negative affect are associated with elevated risk for the development of 
comorbid symptoms of emotional disorders over time, thus explaining the role of rumination in 
these reciprocal relations between symptoms of depression and anxiety over time. These 
associations may result from the direct effects of rumination on positive and negative affect or 
from the wide range of other negative consequences of rumination including poor problem-
solving and decreased interpersonal functioning (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; 
Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Further, RNT increases vulnerability to multiple anxiety and 
depressive disorders and, as a common risk factor, elevated RNT may account for the high levels 
of comorbidity observed between emotional disorders (McEvoy et al., 2013; Starr & Davila, 
2012). After controlling for depression and worry, Watkins (2009) revealed rumination is 
positively associated with anxiety.  
Thus, more recent research is moving in the direction where worry and rumination are 
related to both anxiety and depression and there may not be clear delineations between the two 
concepts in the development and maintenance of these disorders (Blagden & Craske, 1996; 
Fresco et al., 2002; Molina et al., 1998; Muris, Roelofs, Meesters, & Boosmana, 2004; Nolen-
Hoeksems, 2000; Segerstrom et al., 2000; Siegle, Moore, & Thase, 2004; Starcevic, 1995; 
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Watkins et al., 2005).  For example, research points to evidence implicating RNT in a multitude 
of disorders including a number of Anxiety and Mood disorders, thereby classifying RNT as a 
transdiagnostic process (Harvey et al., 2004; Kalmbach et al., 2016; Kircanski et al., 2015; 
Klemanski et al., 2016; McEvoy et al., 2013, Spinhoven, Drost, van Hemert, & Penninx, 2015). 
Segerstrom et al. (2000) found that individuals prone to elevated levels of RNT, which includes 
both worry and rumination, were more likely to experience anxiety and depression. Interestingly, 
According to Ehring and Watkin’s (2008) review of the literature, RNT was found to be present 
in non-control groups in up to thirteen disorders including: (a) Depression (e.g., Thomsen, 2006; 
Watkins, 2008), (b) PTSD (e.g., Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Ehring, Ehlers, & Frank, 2008), (c) 
Social anxiety disorder (e.g., Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006), (d) 
OCD (e.g., Abramowitz, Whiteside, Kalsy, & Tolin, 2003; Amir, Cashman, & Foa, 1997), (e) 
Insomnia (e.g. Harvey, 2002), (f) Eating disorders (e.g., Nolen–Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & 
Bohon, 2007; Sassaroli et al., 2005), (g) Pain disorder (e.g., Eccleston, Crombez, Aldrich, & 
Stannard, 2001; Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik, 1995), (h) Hypochondriasis (Fink et al., 2004), (i) 
Alcohol use disorder (Nolen–Hoeksema & Harrell, 2002; Nolen–Hoeksema et al., 2007), (j) 
Psychosis (e.g., Freeman & Garety, 1999; Morrison & Wells, 2007), (k) Bipolar disorder (e.g., 
Thomas & Bentall, 2002; Thomas, Knowles, Tai, & Bentall, 2007), (l) GAD (Gentes & Ruscio, 
2015), and (m) Panic disorder (McEvoy et al., 2013).	
How Worry and Rumination leads to Psychopathology 
	
Worry and rumination are behaviors that exist on a spectrum. These are behaviors all 
people engage in to some degree, but an important question may be when and how these 
processes become dysfunctional and are linked to the development and maintenance of 
psychopathology. According to Ehring and Watkins (2008): 
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One implicit assumption of the transdiagnostic approach is that a process is found in 
multiple disorders because it reflects a normative process also found in healthy controls 
(i.e., a continuum-dimensional approach to psychological disorders, with the same basic 
processes and mechanisms active in both normal controls and patients, but in a more 
extreme form in patients). (p. 200) 
Since worrisome and ruminative thought processes can be found in clinical and non-
clinical groups, many theories have been proposed in an attempt to explain what exactly moves 
these processes from a functional realm to a dysfunctional one.  Cognitive theorists posit that 
RNTs are generated in response to unattained goals (Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996).  Since both 
clinical and non-clinical individuals have personal concerns or goals that have not been 
successfully met, it is believed that individuals who experience clinically significant symptoms 
become “stuck” in excessive RNT because their goals may be more extreme, perfectionistic in 
nature, and less attainable (Ehring & Watkins, 2008).  Additional proposed theories to explain 
excessive RNT include a tendency by some individuals to focus more on the self  (internalizing) 
at the expense of being aware of the environment and the cues it provides (externalizing) 
(Ingram, 1990). Furthermore, some individuals have a propensity to favor abstract over concrete 
processing (Watkins, 2008), which may lead to excessive RNTs and therefore a higher risk of 
developing clinically significant symptomatology. While concrete processing generally results in 
action plans with associated steps (who and what), thereby decreasing RNT and the associated 
risk of developing RNT related psychopathology (Lyubomirsky et. al, 2013); individuals who are 
more likely to utilize abstract processing frequently ask questions that may increase use of RNTs 
to make sense of situations. Examples of such abstract processing questions include Why does 
this always happen to me? And Why am I so unlucky? Versus concrete processing which 
includes questions such as What steps am I going to take next to resolve this situation? Another 
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theory for the maintenance of RNT is a strongly held belief that engaging in more RNTs will 
lead to positive outcomes and goal attainment; when in fact it does not aid them in finding 
effective solutions (Wells & Papageorgiou, 2004).  As a result of those held beliefs, these 
individuals continue the repetitive thought cycle constantly in search of a solution.  
The additional question of whether RNT across the different disorders should be regarded 
as one single process with identical phenomenological and functional properties cannot yet be 
conclusively answered as the available empirical evidence on this issue is limited. However, 
converging evidence from studies using different methodological approaches suggests that at 
least the two most prototypical types of RNT; namely, worry and depressive rumination, show 
many more similarities than clear differences. It therefore appears reasonable to adopt the 
parsimonious hypothesis that worry and rumination share a strongly interrelated process with 
several factors. In addition to being repetitive, difficult to control, and negative in content, this 
process appears to also be characterized by a predominance of verbal stimuli, to adopt an abstract 
quality, and to be possibly related to other negative cognitions. By using a trandiagnostic  
approach to further examine worry and rumination, researchers may begin to isolate the 
underlying factors of RNTs and develop specific interventions to reduce the use of RNTs overall 
and bring their use to a more functional and normative state. This has implications on enhancing 
the treatment of a variety of clinical disorders by targeting the underlying processes of 
distressing symptoms.   
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Chapter V: Method 
Purpose of the Study 
The proposed study will examine rumination and worry in the context of various 
disorders, and will review a transdiagnostic treatment, Unified Protocol for Transdiagnostic  
Treatment of Emotional Disorders, that addresses these constructs. The review will focus on 
two types of repetitive negative thinking, worry and rumination, more specifically the (a) 
definition, (b) process, (c) theories, and (d) maintenance of psychopathology.  A second focus 
of the analysis will be on the Unified Protocol for Transdiagnostic Treatment of Emotional 
Disorders (UP), more specifically the rationale for using a transdiagnostic treatment, an 
overview of the UP treatment modules, a review of the UP literature, and implications for 
future treatments.  The literature will be synthesized and subsequently analyzed based on the 
following, (a) authors, (b) types of therapies, (c) results, (d) discussion/conclusions and 
clinical implications, and (e) critical appraisal and suggested future directions. The critical 
appraisal component will include an emphasis on the research and interventions with UP and their 
impact on reducing worry and rumination.    
Literature Identification 
Literature to be reviewed on worry, rumination, and UP, will be identified through 
comprehensive searches of the following electronic EBSCOhost databases: PsycArticles, 
PsychINFO, PubMed, ProQuest, PsychiatryOnline, and WorldCat, in addition to public 
databases such as Google Scholar. The terms used to search the databases will include worry, 
rumination, transdiagnostic, anxiety, depression, GAD, PTSD, OCD, SAD,  
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treatment, UP, culture, and groups. The searches will involve using the library systems of Pepperdine 
and Loyola Marymount Universities, as well as the Public Library system of Los Angeles, applying 
the same terminology as noted above.   
Presentation of Findings 
	
The comprehensive review of the literature will be presented in prose and comprised 
of separate chapters. The first chapter will elucidate the importance of worry and rumination in 
the development and maintenance of psychopathology across various diagnosable disorders, 
providing definitions and context for the constructs. The second chapter will include a detailed 
exploration regarding the processes of rumination and worry in depression, GAD, PTSD, OCD, 
and SAD.  The third chapter will highlight the similarities and differences between worry and 
rumination, especially as they are discussed in parallel often in the extant literature; and the 
implications of these similarities and differences in developing explanatory mechanisms in 
psychopathology and consequently treatments to address the associated clinical problems.  The 
fourth chapter will feature a limited discussion of culture and psychopathology. The final 
chapter will focus on the rationale, overview, and literature associated with UP.   Additionally, 
the chapter will include ideas for future research.  
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Chapter VI: Culture and Psychopathology 
While it is beyond the scope of this document to comprehensively review the literature on 
the manifestation of depressive and anxiety disorders across cultures, some examples of the 
varied presentations of depression and anxiety may serve to remind clinicians of the importance 
of considering and attuning to a patient’s culture while delivering any psychotherapeutic 
intervention. Prior to considering the differences among various cultural manifestations of worry 
and rumination concepts and dimensions, it is useful to begin with the consideration of a shared 
transdiagnostic cross-cultural process that potentially underlies the development, maintenance, 
and exacerbation of clinical symptoms across a spectrum of emotional disorders (e.g., GAD, 
PTSD, OCD), known as “thinking a lot.” This concept, often discussed in the cross-cultural 
literature and represents a possibly universal phenomenon, relates directly to the rationale of why 
it may be beneficial to intervene from a unified approach rather than one that is targeted for 
specific diagnoses.  
Thinking a Lot a Cross-Cultural Similarity 
Despite cultural differences in conceptualizations and operational definitions of worry 
and rumination, more recent literature notes an important phenomenon of similarity; that 
individuals from many cultures engage in repetitive negative thinking (RNT), that can include in 
its conceptualization concepts related to worry and rumination (Hinton, Barlow, Reis, & de Jong, 
2016).  In cross-cultural literature, RNTs are referred as “thinking too much” or “thinking a lot,” 
and regardless of the culture’s conceptualizations of how the mind and body function, or why 
“thinking a lot” occurs, it seems accepted across cultures that engaging in excessive RNTs lead 
to the development of stress (Hinton et al., 2016).  Many researchers have identified “thinking a 
lot” as a key communication of psychological distress; that is, when individuals complain of 
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“thinking a lot,” they are communicating that they are repeatedly thinking (ruminating or 
worrying) about past or future negative events to the point of creating psychological discomfort 
(de Jong 2002; Hinton, et al., 2016; Kaiser et al. 2014; Pedersen, Kienzler, & Gamarra 2010; 
Yarris, 2011, 2014). Hinton et al. (2016) defined “thinking a lot” as locally bound to “a specific 
interpersonal, economic, and treatment course in a locality; ‘thinking a lot’ and its symptoms are 
labeled, reacted to, and treated in a locality in a specific way that gives rise to a certain social, 
economic, and treatment course” (Hinton, et al., 2016, p.575).  Notably, “thinking a lot” is 
identified as one of nine cultural concepts of distress in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).  Since individuals with different emotional disorders report excessive and 
repetitive thinking about their current concerns, problems, past experiences, or worries about the 
future, and because such RNT is found across diverse problems including affective disorders and 
anxiety disorders, researchers have proposed RNT as a definite transdiagnostic process that leads 
to psychopathology which may then be categorized into various DSM-5 diagnoses or culture-
bound syndromes (Hinton et al., 2016). RNTs may explain the observed shared variance in 
emotional disorders across cultures, and may also serve as a rationale to turn our attention to 
transdiagnostic perspectives in the development of effective treatments. However, there are 
important cultural differences to consider in the manifestations of worry and ruminations as well, 
which will weigh heavily into the tailoring of even unified treatment approaches for specific 
individuals and their unique expressions of symptomatology. Some of the important cultural 
differences found in extant literature are described in the subsequent section.   
Cultural Differences 
	
An evaluation of cultural differences in the presentation of various disorders requires that 
a distinction be made between disease and illness.  Diseases (e.g. hypertension, hypothyroidism) 
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are biomedical and are present across cultures, whereas illnesses are culturally bound and 
subjectively experienced (Stein & Williams, 2010). Essentially, a cultural group, race, or 
ethnicity may be related to a given psychological phenomenon (Stein & William, 2010). 
According to Hofmann & Hinton (2014), the subjective experience of the illness is influenced by 
two main factors: 1) how individuals from different cultures understand the mind and body 
connection, and 2) the impact that culturally specific social norms and rules have on both an 
individual and the greater society.  The first factor relates to the influence of individuals’ 
understanding of their own body on the individual expression of psychopathology (Hofmann & 
Hinton, 2014). For example, the interpretation of symptoms of a panic attack may differ by 
culture; while Americans may attribute the tightness in their chests to a heart attack, Cambodians 
believe they are having a wind attack (Khayâl cap), which is described as a rising of wind and 
blood in the body that can have deleterious effects (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).   
The second factor identified by the authors relates to the importance of contextual factors, 
including social normal and group rules, in influencing the behavior of individuals. Some of the 
well-researched, circumstantial factors include: (a) collectivistic vs. individualistic cultures and 
(b) self-construals which is defined as the extent to which individuals view themselves as 
independent vs. interdependent of others (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014). For example, in 
collectivistic cultures, the harmony between thoughts, feelings and behaviors is a primary focus 
because of the higher societal calling on synchronization within the group. In many collectivistic 
cultures, embarrassing other group member by not maintaining emotional harmony often is 
associated with feelings of individual shame (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014). Within the framework 
of anxiety and depression this may lead to worry and rumination about embarrassing oneself and 
others and feelings of shame (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014).  Alternatively, people’s thoughts and 
feelings about themselves determine behavior in individualistic cultures generally leading to 
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feelings of guilt and self-blame (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014).   Similarly, self-construals impact 
the manifestation of psychopathology (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
In a sense, Hofmann & Hinton (2014) acknowledge that culture influences and affects the 
content but not the process of psychopathology, such as depression and anxiety. The differences 
seen between cultures are dependent on the beliefs individuals have about their emotional 
experiences (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014). Consequently, culture is of profound importance to the 
experience of both depression and anxiety, the construction of meaning and social response to 
illness within families and communities, the course and outcome of disorders, and thus to the 
very constitution of emotional illness (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014).  
Culture and depression. As outlined previously, much of the research on the function of 
rumination carried out in psychology is undertaken on participants from western cultures and is 
then generalized as a whole. Currently, the findings from research conducted in western cultures 
overwhelmingly suggest that the role of rumination is associated with the maintenance of distress 
and also with depression (Just & Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow & Fredrickson, 1993; Rood, Roelofs, Bogels, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Schouten, 2009).  Importantly, however, research on the role of rumination in behavior and 
psychopathology in western cultures does not necessarily transfer from one culture to another.  
For example, Grossmann & Kross (2010) found that when Russians engage in rumination they 
simultaneously create self-distance (i.e., seeing experiences as an outside observer). 
Consequently, the impact of rumination is modulated downward (Grossmann & Kross, 2010).  
Additionally, a study investigating rumination across various ages and cultures found that 
rumination was lower in older Americans versus younger Americans (Grossmann, Karasawa, 
Kan, & Kitayama, 2014).  In contrast, rumination levels were found to be uniform and equal  
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throughout the ages among Japanese participants (Grossman et al., 2010). These examples 
highlight how cultural diversity manifests and impacts individual and group thoughts, behaviors, 
and well-being. 
Culture and anxiety disorders. As discussed extensively in a previous section, anxiety 
disorders are some of the most prevalent mental disorders.  However, these disorders are 
strongly influenced by ethnic, racial, and cultural factors, in part because of culturally 
dependent variations in the beliefs about the underlying physiology of the illness syndromes and 
the social context and norms a person is exposed to (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014).  Cross-cultural 
research provides a wealth of evidence suggesting that anxiety and disorders of anxiety are 
universally present in human societies (Good & Kleinman, 1985). However, cross-cultural 
exploration also demonstrates that the phenomenology of such disorders and the meaningful 
forms through which distress is articulated varies in quite significant ways across cultures 
(Good & Kleinman, 1985).  Thus, since excessive, exaggerated worry is a symptom that has 
been often associated with anxiety disorders, it is beneficial to explore how worry differs across 
various cultures.  
Cross-cultural research has identified three primary ways that the Western experience of 
worry/anxiety differs from other cultures. First, according to Friedman (1997), Western cultures 
tend to focus primarily on the emotional experiences of excessive worry to the exclusion of the 
somatic presentations of worry. In many other cultures, worry is often characterized 
somatically; for example, in some African cultures, worry and the manifesting feelings of 
anxiety are experienced somatically as parasites crawling on the body and the head (Friedman, 
1997).  A second salient difference observed between cultures is the content of worries. For 
example, in Western cultures, the content of worry in OCD is distressing and worrying is 
viewed as a method to rid oneself of these thoughts (Clark, 2004; Fergus & Wu, 2010; McKay 
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& Greisberg, 2002). In contrast, in some non-Western cultures, obsessions are believed to stem 
from ancestral displeasure or intentional witchcraft leading individuals to believe that worry 
functions to reduce the impact of the bewitchment or lessen ancestral anger (Stein & Williams, 
2002). Third, the experience of worry has been found to differ across cultures as a function of 
self-construal, specifically whether individuals view themselves as independent or 
interdependent (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014). In Japanese and other Eastern cultures, Taijun-
kyofu-sho (TKS) is a disorder that shares many similarities with social anxiety disorder 
(Hofmann & Hinton, 2014; Kirmayer, 1991) with a key difference of self-construal. As opposed 
to Western cultures where worry is primarily focused on avoiding personal embarrassment 
(independence), in Eastern cultures and in TKS individuals worry about embarrassing and 
offending others (interdependence; Kleinknecht, Dinnel, Kleinknecht, Hiruma, & Harada, 1997; 
Lewis-Fernandez et al., 2010; Hofman & Hinton, 2014). Thus, cross-cultural research on 
emotional and somatic expressions of anxiety, the content of worry, and processes of self-
construal provide strong evidence that a person’s cultural background influences the experience 
and expression of emotions. 
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Chapter VII: Unified Protocol for Transdiagnostic Treatment of Emotional Disorders 
Rationale for Transdiagnostic Therapies 
 
 As previously discussed, worry and rumination are RNTs that underlie a multitude of 
emotional disorders, including mood and anxiety disorders (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & 
Shafran, 2004; Segerstrom, Hardy, Evans, Boggero, Alden, & Stanton, 2016; Segerstrom, Roach, 
Evans, Schipper, & Darville, 2010; Watkins, 2008). Mood and anxiety disorders are often 
referred to as emotional disorders because they are characterized by intense negative emotions 
that are maintained by patients’ efforts to avoid or escape these aversive emotional experiences 
(Barlow, Sauer-Zavala, Carl, Bullis, & Ellard, 2014). Further, although using different 
methodological approaches, studies directly comparing worry and rumination have revealed 
more similarities than differences between these processes (Barlow et al., 2014), which may not 
be surprising since emotional disorders are highly comorbid with each other (Kessler et al., 
2005).  In a National comorbidity study, 12-month DSM-IV disorders were found to be highly 
prevalent in the United States, with anxiety disorders ranked as the most common mental 
disorder, followed by mood disorders (Kessler et al., 2005).  Comorbidity profiles revealed more 
than 57% of 12-month cases of anxiety and depression were comorbid, while lifetime prevalence 
rates for comorbidity between anxiety and affective disorders were 81% (Brown, Campbell, 
Lehman, Grisham & Mancill, 2001; Kessler et al., 2005).  The high rate of comorbid disorders 
among community populations (and not necessarily those that qualify for the strict 
inclusion/exclusion criteria necessary to establish efficacy in clinical trials) suggests that 
transdiagnostic treatments may better address the types of patients that present routinely in 
clinical practice. Importantly, Transdiagnostic treatments allow for symptom reduction across the 
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comorbid disorders, especially for those symptoms that have common underlying mechanisms 
(such as worry and rumination) rather than targeting symptoms associated with a single disorder.  
In addition to the aforementioned highly comorbid clinical presentations, it appears that 
many emotional disorders share the likely universal process of RNTs (the terminology ascribed 
to most Western literature) or “thinking a lot”  (the terminology ascribed to most cross-cultural 
studies; Hinton et al., 2016).   Evidence from cross-cultural studies suggest that RNTs or 
“thinking a lot may play a crucial role in the development and/or maintenance of psychological 
disorders, combined with findings that display hardly any differences in process characteristics 
of RNT/”thinking a lot” between anxiety and affective disorders, it is possible that the need for 
disorder specific treatments will no longer be the gold standard. In their place, clinicians will be 
called upon to learn and implement a parsimonious number of evidence-based treatments (Ellard, 
Fairholme, Boisseau, Farchione, & Barlow, 2010) or techniques, with an aim towards unified 
approaches or transdiagnostic protocols. 
As discussed previously, transdiagnostic treatments address the likely universal process 
of RNTs/”thinking a lot,” under which worry and rumination are subsumed. Furthermore, 
transdiagnostic treatments address the potential self-report bias that may be especially prevalent 
among certain cultures that are likely to ascribe self-stigma with regards to mental illness 
diagnoses and identification by shifting the focus away from a categorical conceptualization of 
psychopathology (which represents status as a “disordered individual”) to a dimensional one 
(which suggests that mental health is based on establishing an optimal range for the expression 
of a particular trait or characteristic).  Therefore, the use of a transdiagnostic approach may help 
to address the significant barrier that stigma can present for individuals who are in high need of 
care but experience difficulty seeking and engaging in specialty mental health care. Instead of 
focusing on symptom reduction or disorder “cures,” a transdiagnostic approach naturally lends 
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itself to establishing and tracking other markers for progress such as quality of life and activities 
of daily functioning improvement. Manuals can be developed around the concept of learning 
skills to better one’s life, and to find the optimal dose of “thinking a lot” that helps the individual 
strive towards and achieve goals but does not hold them back due to the engagement in excessive 
ruminative content. Transdiagnostic approaches have the potential to shift the field’s traditional 
focus on correcting dysfunction to improving function, in line with recent approaches that have 
underscored the importance of positive psychology and the proliferation of strength-based 
interventions. 
Presently, many psychotherapeutic interventions focus on a single disorder and are 
delivered through manualized, single-disorder protocols (SDP). Often times, the differences 
between these protocols are minimal (Ellard et al., 2010; Wilamowska et al., 2010).  The 
limitations associated with this approach to therapy include the cost and time associated with 
training clinicians to competently deliver disorder-specific manualized treatments, the 
expectation that clinicians will achieve mastery of multiple treatment modalities, and the burden 
on patients to access the appropriate treatment (Barlow et al., 2017; Norton & Roberge, 2017; 
Wilamowska et al., 2010). Furthermore, the sheer number of manualized treatment protocols 
make it challenging for clinicians to choose among them (Wilamowska et al., 2010).  Thus, the 
barriers associated with single-disorder treatments discussed above render the need for fresh 
insight and new interventions in an effort to increase patient access to trained clinicians.  
In response to these problems, transdiagnostic approaches to treatment emphasizing 
commonalities across disorders have been attracting greater attention.  A unified treatment 
approach could increase clinician treatment mastery and address patient access to treatment, 
while simultaneously treating co-morbid disorders (Barlow et al., 2017) Transdiagnostic 
treatments are also more cost effective and time efficient (Bullis et al., 2015). Research focusing 
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on the efficacy of transdiagnostic treatment of psychopathology is a relatively recent 
development in the field of psychology and advances in scientific research are leading to a more 
dimensional (i.e., degree to which a characteristic or symptom is present) versus categorical 
conceptualization of psychopathology (Ellard et al., 2010). When psychopathology is 
conceptualized dimensionally, issues related to comorbidity, NOS diagnoses, and subclinical 
presentations are substantially reduced, leading to a more direct approach to treatment planning 
(Ellard, et al., 2010).  One transdiagnostic treatment that has been garnering attention in the 
recent literature is the Unified Protocol for the Trasdiagnostic Treatment of Emotional 
Disorders (UP).    
Overview of Unified Protocol for Transdiagnostic Treatment of Emotional Disorders  
	
 The UP was developed to treat emotional disorders, including GAD, PTSD, OCD, SAD, 
Panic Disorder, Agoraphobia, and mood disorders (Barlow et al., 2011). The UP was developed 
utilizing research, information and data from the schools of neuroscience, learning theory, 
emotional development, emotion regulation, and cognitive science (&, Allen & Choate, 2004, 
Ellard et al., 2010).  The literature suggests that emotional disorders, such as anxiety and 
unipolar mood disorders (depressive disorders) share commonalities, including both biological 
vulnerabilities (e.g., genetics) and psychological vulnerabilities (e.g., early life experiences) 
(Barlow, Allen, & Choate, 2004; Brown, 2007; Brown & Barlow, 2009). Additionally,  
investigations into mood and anxiety disorders have led to the identification of commonalities 
across cognitive, behavioral, and emotion regulation domains (Ellard, et al., 2010). Thus, the UP 
was designed to treat the underlying factors contributing and maintaining emotional disorders 
rather than targeting disorder specific symptomology (Barlow et al., 2011; Gallagher et al., 
2013).  
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In order to achieve this objective, the UP extracts various treatment components from 
existing evidence-based treatment approaches to create a modules-based treatment for emotional 
disorders (Gallagher et al., 2013).  Primarily, the UP integrates the fundamental principles of 
CBT, mindfulness, and acceptance based principles by, challenging maladaptive thoughts 
(RNTs), by changing action urges associated with ineffective emotions, by targeting behavioral 
and emotional avoidance, by focusing on the present moment, and by utilizing exposure 
techniques (Barlow et al., 2011).  Moreover, the UP incorporates interventions that focus on 
deficits in emotion regulation since emotion dysregulation is an underlying feature of emotional 
disorders  (Barlow et al., 2011; Fairholme, Boisseau, Ellard, Ehrenreich, & Barlow, 2010). 
Essentially, the focus of the UP is to counter emotion driven behaviors (EDBs), which 
can interfere with patients’ lives. EDB is generally defined as acting on an internal urge that 
generally will lead to trouble in the individual’s life. The UP focuses on how patients experience 
and react to their own emotions rather than how they react to situational factors, such as feared 
stimuli (e.g., public places, traveling by airplane; Barlow et al., 2017).  Thus, the goal of the UP 
is to teach patients new ways to respond to uncomfortable emotions, which in turn, impacts 
individual behavioral choices and generally will result in a reduction of symptoms and 
psychopathology (Norton & Paulus, 2016).  
A profound departure from disorder-specific treatments of various emotional disorders, 
the UP is designed to be applicable to all anxiety and unipolar mood disorders, as well as other 
disorders with strong emotional components. The goals of treatment are accomplished through 
eight modules:  (a) Enhancing motivation (b) Psychoeducation regarding the function of 
emotions (c) Mindful and nonjudgmental emotional awareness, (d) Cognitive flexibility, (e) 
Identifying and preventing patterns of emotional avoidance, (f) Increasing awareness and 
tolerance of emotion related sensations, (g) Interoceptive and situational emotion-focused 
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exposures, and (h) Relapse prevention (Barlow, et al., 2017; Gallagher et al., 2013; Wilamowska 
et al., 2010).  Five of the eight modules (#3-7 on the list above) are considered to be core UP 
modules, meaning that they deliver the core components of treatment (Barlow et al., 2011; 
Wilamowska et al., 2010).  With regards to delivering treatment, the modular design allows for 
flexibility whereby modules can be tailored in length to meet the specific needs of patients 
(Barlow et al., 2011; Wilamowska et al., 2010).  The UP is designed to be delivered in 12-18 
sessions for 50-60 minutes in length (Barlow et al., 2011).  However, as mentioned previously, 
the length of treatment may vary and the treatment allows for this variation based on the specific 
patient’s presentation of distress (Barlow et al., 2011). The manualized sessions are allocated as 
follows (Barlow 2011):   
1. Module 1 - Motivation Enhancement for Treatment Engagement: 1 Session 
2. Module 2 - Psychoeducation and Tracking of Emotional Experiences: 1-2 
Sessions 
3. Module 3 - Emotion Awareness Training: 1-2 Sessions 
4. Module 4 - Cognitive Appraisal and Reappraisal: 1-2 Sessions 
5. Module 5 - Emotion Avoidance and Emotion-Driven Behaviors (EDBs): 1-2 
Sessions 
6. Module 6 - Awareness and Tolerance of Physical Sensations: 1 Session 
7. Module 7 -Interoceptive and Situation-Based Emotion Exposures: 4-6 Sessions 
8. Module 8 - Relapse Prevention: 1 Session 
The main principle across the five core modules is to help patients reduce reactivity to negative 
emotions and increase emotional regulation skills.  The main goals of each of the eight UP 
modules are outlined below. 
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Module 1: Motivation enhancement for treatment engagement.  The first module, 
motivational enhancement for treatment engagement, focuses on increasing commitment, 
motivation and readiness for behavioral change (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne, Ellard, Farchione, 
Fairholme, & Barlow, 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010).  Many of the interventions in this module 
are based on Motivational Interviewing (MI) and more specifically on research outlining the 
adaptation of MI for anxiety and mood disorders (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et. al, 2014; Westra 
& Dozois, 2002 & 2006; Wilamowska et al., 2010). MI is a counseling approach that was 
developed by Miller and Rollnick (2002) in which patients are encouraged to engage in behavior 
change through the exploration and resolution of ambivalence. There are three main goals 
associated with this module: (a) facilitating the patient’s motivation to engage in treatment 
through committed action (Barlow et al., 2011; Boswell, Bentley, & Barlow, 2015; Wilamowska 
et al., 2010); (b) outlining the costs associated with not making behavioral changes (Barlow et 
al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010); and (c) creating treatment goals which 
are specific, personal, and achievable (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et 
al., 2010). Although there is usually one session wholly dedicated to motivational enhancement, 
clinicians are encouraged to refer back to the material in this module throughout treatment if and 
when they notice waning motivation (Wilamowska et al., 2010). 
 Module 2: Psychoeducation and tracking of emotional experiences.  The overarching 
goal of this module is to work with patients in the service of fostering an understanding of the 
function of emotions and to facilitate their awareness of when they are having emotional 
experiences (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). Similar to the 
first module, Module 2 has three main goals. The first goal is to explain the function of emotions 
and the ways in which positive and negative emotions are necessary, adaptive, and functional 
(Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010).  The second goal is to 
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educate patients on the three components of emotional experiences: (a) thoughts (i.e., what 
people think, including RNTs);  (b) behaviors (what people do); and (c) physiological responses 
(how people physically feel; Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). 
The third goal is to present the concept of EDBs; chiefly, how they are often automatic and 
adaptive in nature (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). For 
example, patients may learn that when they feel fear, their automatic behavioral response is to 
fight, flee or freeze which is adaptive in the face of true danger. 
 Module 3: Emotion awareness training.  The third module is the first core module in 
the UP and transitions the patient from motivation and psychoeducation to skill building.  The 
module focuses on taking a nonjudgmental approach toward one’s present focused emotional 
experiences (Barlow et al., 2011; Wilamowska et al., 2010). Patients develop skills to observe 
and describe their emotional experiences in the present moment (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et 
al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). These skills allow patients to determine which thoughts, 
behaviors, and physical sensations are contributing to their distress (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et 
al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010).  Even though the creators of this therapy (Barlow et al., 
2011) do not highlight the similarities between the skills taught in this module and the skills 
taught in DBT, this module shares many concepts with emotion regulation strategies of observe, 
describe, non-judgmentally, and one-mindfully employed in Dialectical Behavior Therapy 
(Linehan, 1993).  
 Module 4: Cognitive appraisal and reappraisal.  The ultimate goal of the fourth 
module is to increase cognitive flexibility (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska 
et al., 2010).  Cognitive flexibility is the human ability to adapt cognitive processing strategies to 
face new and unexpected conditions, both in one’s internal and external environments (Barlow et 
al., 2011). Flexibility in thinking is achieved by (a) highlighting how appraisal of a situation 
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impacts the response; (b) explaining the interrelationship between thoughts, behaviors, emotions, 
and physiological responses; (c) identifying thinking patterns (maladaptive thinking traps); and 
(d) reappraising maladaptive thoughts and generating alternative thoughts.  It appears that the 
interventions in this module draw from concepts and interventions found in Beckian CBT. More 
specifically, patients are conceptualized as being in distress due to the way in which their 
perception of a situation influences their mental, emotional, physical and behavioral reactions 
(Beck, 1979). Moreover, research supports cognitive modification, or identifying dysfunctional 
thoughts in order to make behavioral change, as being a central mechanism of change in CBT 
(Lorenzo-Luaces, Keefe, & DeRubeis, 2016). 
 Module 5: Emotion avoidance and emotion driven behaviors (EDBs).  The fifth 
module (third core module) helps patients to alter set patterns of emotional responding by 
gaining an understanding of how EDBs may maintain their distress (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne 
et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010).  The goal of this module is to help patients identify and 
counter behaviors that impede exposure to and processing of emotions, including behavioral 
avoidance (e.g., procrastination and staying in bed), cognitive avoidance (e.g., rumination and 
worry) and safety behaviors (e.g., rubbing a piece of fabric; Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 
2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). Similarly, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) 
identifies experiential avoidance as a process underlying different psychological disorders such 
as anxiety and mood disorders through. ACT defines experiential avoidance as the deliberate 
effort to avoid and/or escape from private events such as affects, thoughts, memories and bodily 
sensations that are experienced as aversive (Hayes, 2004). Within the UP, EDBs can be 
conceptualized as a form of experiential avoidance, and thus would function as a class of 
behaviors that are negatively reinforced, thereby leading to the maintenance of the behavior(s) 
associated with psychopathology.    
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 Module 6:  Awareness and Tolerance of Physical Sensations.  This module (fourth 
core module) creates linkage for the patient between physical sensations and emotional 
experiences  (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010).  The main 
intervention in this module is interoceptive exposure. Interoceptive exposure consists of a 
multitude of experiential exercises that are designed to evoke the same physical sensations that 
are experienced when a patient is anxious or distressed, with the goal of reducing a patient’s  
conditioned emotional and behavioral response to the physical sensation (Barlow et al., 2011; 
Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010).   Interoceptive exposure is a technique commonly 
used in CBT for anxiety disorders, and recent research indicates its efficacy in treating OCD 
(Blakey & Abromowitz, 2018).  
 Module 7: Interoceptive and Situation-Based Emotion Exposures.  The fifth and final 
core module targets internal triggers (i.e., emotional and physical reactions) and external triggers 
(i.e., environmental) (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010).  In this 
module, in-vivo and imaginal exposure interventions are added to interoceptive exercises to 
target physical reactions and emotional and behavioral avoidance, with the goal of increasing 
tolerance of uncomfortable emotions and allowing new learning to occur (Barlow et al., 2011; 
Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010).  These exposure techniques are used in therapies 
such as prolonged exposure therapy for PTSD (Foa, 2011) and exposure and response prevention 
for OCD (Franklin & Foa, 2011). 
Module 8: Relapse Prevention. During the relapse prevention module, patient goals are 
reviewed and reinforced and patient progress is discussed (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 
2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010).  Patients are reminded through psychoeducation about the 
vacillating nature of emotions, how to identify emotions and maladaptive behaviors, how to  
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apply the skills learned in therapy in order to mitigate the chance of relapse, and how to respond 
to relapse if and when it occurs (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 
2010). 
Unified Protocol, Worry and Rumination 
 UP potentially targets worry and rumination by counteracting experiential avoidance and 
encouraging behavioral activation. UP hypothesizes it decreases worry and rumination through 
its core modules, which contain elements of mindfulness and acceptance based therapies (e.g., 
DBT, ACT), cognitive therapies (e.g., CBT), and behavioral therapies (e.g., ERP).  For example, 
Module 3 focuses on increasing emotional awareness by utilizing mindfulness and acceptance 
based approaches. Because the modules integrate multiple therapeutic approaches, the patients 
learn skills that both target a range of unpleasant states and enhance their capacity to implement 
present moment acceptance when they engage in the maladaptive processes of worry and 
rumination, emotion dysregulation, intolerance of uncertainty, or over reliance on problem 
solving.  Further, Module 4 emphasizes cognitive restructuring, an intervention which may 
alleviate some of the symptoms of worry and rumination, including increased cognitive 
distortions, negative interpretations of the current moment, and negative outlook of the future. 
Finally, the behavioral interventions utilized in Modules 5 through 7 target the process of fear 
and the avoidance of emotional experiencing generated by excessive worry and rumination. 
Thus, by working through the five core modules and by facilitating exposure and interoceptive 
experiences, a patient learns mindful awareness of their emotional experiences, in addition to 
identifying and preventing behavioral emotional avoidance. Consequently, the UP interventions 
may reduce worry and rumination and subsequently impact symptom severity in anxiety and  
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depressive disorders. However, further research would need to be undertaken to validate whether 
the theory behind the development of UP can enact concrete and observable changes in thoughts 
and behaviors. 
Review of the Unified Protocol Literature 
 Extant research on the UP is relatively sparse and recent (within the last 7 years) with 
only two open pilot trials and two randomized control trials (RCT).  Although limited and further 
validation with replication studies are needed, the data to date are encouraging. The trials, results 
and limitations are outlined below.  
Unified protocol trials.  The first UP pilot trial was conducted by Ellard et al., (2010). 
The investigators tested an early version of the UP in an open trial to determine patient 
acquisition and implementation of the core skills and to receive feedback on the logical 
progression of treatment.  The sample consisted of 18 heterogeneous patients with a mean age of 
30 years old, with diagnoses of MDD, dysthymia, GAD, PTSD, OCD, SAD and panic disorder 
with agoraphobia (Ellard et al., 2010).  At pretreatment, study participants had an average 
number of diagnoses of 1.94.  Patients were then administered extensive pre and post treatment 
assessments to determine the impact of treatment on clinical diagnoses, symptom severity, and 
daily functioning (Ellard et al., 2010). Following initial assessment, patients were seen for an 
average of 13 treatment sessions by six doctoral students with 1-4 years of clinical experience 
(Ellard et al., 2010). The results indicated that treatment with the UP led to a reduction in scores 
from pre to post treatment on symptoms of anxiety and depression (Ellard et al., 2010). While 
symptom reduction was evident post-treatment, symptom severity remained at a clinical level 
(Ellard et al., 2010).  Thus, the results indicated to researchers the need for further treatment 
refinement (Ellard et al., 2010). 
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 Subsequent to the pilot study, the UP manual was revised to increase patients’ awareness, 
specifically regarding the impact of their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in the present-moment 
(Ellard et al., 2010). It was hypothesized that this revision would enhance patients’ 
understanding of their own emotional experiences, which would allow them to increase the 
exploration of their dysfunctional emotional regulation strategies, and increase acquisition of 
emotion regulation skills (Ellard et al., 2010). Once the UP protocol revision was complete, a 
second pilot open-trial was conducted with a sample size of 15 participants, mean age of 29.73 
years, who were each seen for approximately 17 sessions (Ellard et al., 2010).  In contrast to the 
first study, participants in this study evidenced a reduction of symptom severity to below 
diagnostic thresholds whereby they no longer met criteria for their respective diagnoses (Ellard 
et al., 2010). Of note, the results were sustained at 6-month follow-up (Ellard et al., 2010) and 
comparable to diagnostic specific CBT protocols for anxiety and depression (Butler, Chapman, 
Forman, Beck, 2006).  Importantly, the results of the studies by Ellard et al. (2010) should be 
interpreted with caution for a multitude of reasons, including the small sample sizes, a lack of 
cultural diversity (Study 1: 94.4% Caucasian; Study 2: 80% Caucasian), no control groups, 
recruitment from only one setting (a university center for anxiety and related disorders), and 
open trials. 
 Further evaluation of the efficacy of the UP was demonstrated in an RCT comparing the 
UP to a wait-list control/delayed treatment condition (Farchione et al., 2012). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions: (a) immediate UP treatment, in which they were 
assessed pre and post treatment and at a 6-month follow-up period, or (b) the wait-list 
control/delayed treatment condition, in which they were assessed at the beginning and end of the 
16-week wait-list period and the end of treatment and at a 6-month follow-up (Farchione et al., 
2012).  A total of 37 patients participated in the study, 94.2% Caucasian, with a mean age of 
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29.32, and a maximum of 16 treatment sessions (Farchione et al., 2012).  The participants had a 
primary anxiety disorders diagnosis with comorbid diagnoses across both the anxiety and the 
depressive disorders (Farchione et al., 2012).  The UP treatment followed the same protocol 
outlined in the second Ellard et al. (2010) study with the addition of motivational interviewing to 
increase engagement in treatment (Farchione et al., 2012).  Results showed clinically significant 
reduction in symptoms across disorders and decreases in functional impairment were 
demonstrated in patients in the UP treatment group in comparison to patients in the wait list 
condition (Farchione et al., 2012). The improvements were maintained at 6-month follow-up, 
lending further evidence for the UP treatment efficacy (Farchione et al., 2012).  Similar to 
previous studies, this study’s main limitations are its small sample size, lack of cultural diversity, 
and participant recruitment from the same setting as the previous two studies. As a result, 
generalizability is difficult. Also, in contrast to previous studies, this study included a wait-list 
condition but not an active treatment comparison, thereby creating the possibility of confounding 
variables (e.g., therapeutic alliance, creation of a safe space). 
 The most recent randomized controlled study for the UP treatment evaluated whether the 
UP is as effective as specific disorder protocols (SPD) in the treatment of principle anxiety 
disorders and comorbid disorders (Barlow et al., 2017).  In this study, 233 patients were assigned 
to the UP, an SDP, or a waitlist control condition (Barlow et al., 2017).  Demographically, the 
participants were 75.78% Caucasian, 7.62% Hispanic, 7.17% Asian. 6.73% African American, 
and 2.69% Other, and averaged 31.10 years old. The study consisted of two phases: a maximum 
16-week treatment/waitlist phase, and a 6-month follow-up phase (Barlow et al., 2017).  To keep 
the active treatment conditions consistent, the UP dosage was matched to SDP for each principal 
diagnosis (Barlow et al., 2017).  Results revealed equivalent outcomes between the UP and SDPs 
at post-treatment and at 6 month follow-up for changes in symptom severity. Both protocols 
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significantly improved the symptom severity of the participants in the study when compared to 
the wait list control condition (Barlow et al., 2017).  Remarkably, the UP condition evidenced 
significantly less attrition than the SDPs condition. This may be due to the UP modules focus on 
increasing motivation (Barlow et al., 2017).  As in the previous three studies, the limitations 
within the research continued to point toward limited cultural diversity, age, and recruitment of 
participants from the same setting. 
Further investigations. Building on the RCT by Farchione et al. (2012) and also using 
data collected from the same participants, Bullis, Fortune, Farchione, and Barlow (2014) 
examined the durability of effect of treatment during an extended follow-up period. As 
mentioned, the sample consisted of some of the original participants in the Farchione et al. 
(2012) study. Bullis et al. (2014) enrolled a total of 15 participants, 11 of whom were from the 
original immediate treatment and 4 of whom were in the delayed treatment, with an average age 
of 32.27 years, and 100% Caucasian. The results revealed that symptom reduction was 
maintained at 18-month post-treatment across a range of anxiety and comorbid disorders, 
although the effect size was larger at the 6-month follow-up than at the 18-month follow-up 
(Bullis, et al., 2014).  Notably, the results suggest no further gains in symptom reduction past the 
6-month follow-up assessment (Bullis et al., 2014).  Since this investigation was a follow-up 
study to the Farchione et al. (2012) study, the limitations from the original study also impacted 
the current study. 
Another follow-up to the Farchione et al. (2012) study was conducted by Sauer-Zavala et 
al. (2012), who sought to clarify the mechanism of change in the UP with regard to negative 
emotions. Sauer-Zavala and her colleagues aimed to understand whether the mechanism of 
change within the UP is due to a reduction in the frequency of negative emotional experiences, 
or a change in patients’ relationship with and ability to tolerate negative emotions when they 
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occur (Sauer-Zavala et al., 2012).  Of note, there is support in the cross-sectional literature that 
effective responding to negative emotions is more important for psychological health than the 
frequency in the occurrence of the negative emotions (Sauer & Baer, 2009; Sauer-Zavala et al., 
2012; Segal Williams & Teasdale, 2002). While analyzing treatment outcomes, it was discovered 
that participating in the UP resulted in a reduction in negative emotion reactivity (Sauer-Zavala 
et al., 2012). More specifically, the data indicated an increase in acceptance and awareness of 
emotions and a decrease in fear around emotions, as well as a decrease in anxiety sensitivity 
(Sauer-Zavala et al., 2012). Of interest, a large effect size was found in the frequency of 
participants’ report of negative emotions between pre and post treatment (Sauer-Zavala et al., 
2012).  Therefore, the results indicate that treatment with the UP reduces both the frequency of 
negative emotions and patients’ relationship and response to negative emotional states (Sauer-
Zavala et al., 2012).  A possible explanation for the results is that effectively managing and 
regulating emotions could lead to a decrease in frequency and intensity of negative emotions, 
which in turn reduces cognitive and emotional avoidance, and the use of control strategies such 
as worry and rumination (Sauer-Zavala et al., 2012). 
Comparable to the two aforementioned follow-up studies of Farchione et al.’s (2012) 
research, Gallagher et al., (2013) also investigated Farchione et al.’s (2012) data in order to 
determine the effects of the UP on one’s quality of life. Quality of life is defined by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) as an  “individual’s perception of their position in life in the context 
of the culture and value systems in which they live, and in relation to their goals, expectations, 
standards, and concerns” (The WHOQOL Group, 1995, p. 1403). The results of this study 
indicated that patients reported an overall increase in their day to day functioning (Gallagher et 
al., 2013). Participants receiving the UP treatment (post treatment and post waitlist) experienced 
significant improvements in quality of life, while also reporting a reduction in their anxiety and 
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depressive symptomatology. Interestingly, the domain with the greatest improvement post 
treatment was associated with self-esteem (Gallagher et al., 2013). The researchers hypothesized 
that: 
Based on conceptualizations of the motivational enhancement, emotional 
awareness, and situational exposure modules of the UP as fostering development 
of positive personal resources, such as self-esteem and self-efficacy, we have 
hypothesized that these therapeutic strategies may exert specific effects on quality 
of life. (Gallagher et al., 2013, p. 64)  
At this point in time, the final study published based on the data collected by Farchione et 
al. (2012) explored the effects of the UP on two dimensions of temperament, namely,  
neuroticism/behavioral inhibition (N/BI) and extraversion/behavioral activation (E/BA) (Carl, 
Gallagher, Sauer-Zavala, Bentley, & Barlow, 2014).  The literature posits that high levels of 
N/BI and low levels of E/BA contribute to the onset, development, overlap, and maintenance of 
anxiety and mood disorders (Brown & Barlow, 2009). In this study, the post treatment in 
comparison with the waitlist control group yielded data that reflected decreases in N/BI and 
increases in E/BA, although the effect size was small and insignificant (Carl, et al., 2014). 
Additionally, slight losses in E/BA gains were noted at 6-month follow-up (Carl, et al., 2014). 
Conversely, more stable change was noted in N/BI from post-treatment to 6-month follow-up 
(Carl, et al., 2014).  As can be gleaned from the discussion above, despite an increasing interest 
in the UP and the process of RNT in the clinical literature, research adopting a truly 
transdiagnostic perspective on this topic is still sparse. It is important for future research to 
determine which specific interventions within UP target worry and rumination.  These 
discoveries will lead to a further understanding of the etiology of various disorders and aide in  
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the implementation of targeted interventions likely to ameliorate the symptoms causing the 
greatest levels of distress.  
Unified protocol group delivery.	To date UP has primarily been studied in the context 
of individual psychotherapy however more recently the protocol is being tested within group 
formats to extend applicability. The benefits of delivering psychotherapeutic services in a group 
format include scalability, time and cost efficiency, ability to practice skills by demonstrating 
and teaching other group members, and interactions among participants that more closely 
emulate the external environment (Bullis, Sauer-Zavala, Bentley, Thompson-Hollands, Carl & 
Barlow, 2014), along with the clear benefits of peer support on promoting mental wellness, 
common among all group-format interventions (Yalom & Leszcz, 2005).  The current literature 
includes one open trial pilot study on the effectiveness of delivering UP treatment in a group 
format (Bullis et al., 2014). The patients (n = 11) completed pre- and post- treatment measures, 
were randomly assigned to two groups and were then treated with 12, 2-hour weekly sessions of 
the UP (Bullis et al., 2014).  The participants were 90.9% Caucasian and averaged 44.55 years of 
age. Although all 11 participants were diagnosed with an emotional disorder, eight out of the 11 
were diagnosed with at least one additional emotional clinical diagnosis (Bullis et al., 2014).  
The session structure followed a standard CBT based group format. Generally, a group agenda 
included reviewing the previous session’s material, collaboratively reviewing the current 
homework, introducing new material and exercises, and then concluding with next week’s 
homework assignment (Bullis et al., 2014).  The results of this study revealed a very strong 
effect on anxiety symptoms, functional impairment, and experiential avoidance and a moderate 
effect on depression symptoms, and life satisfaction (Bullis et al., 2014). Some of the limitations 
associated with this study included a lack of randomization, no control conditions, no cultural 
diversity, no follow-up assessment, and a small sample size. 
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Although the results of the group delivery appear promising, there were challenges 
associated with delivering the material in a group format. Firstly, patients who are highly fearful 
of their emotions may need more direct and individualized intervention by a clinician than can 
delivered in a group format (Bullis et al., 2014).   Secondly, patients may acquire skills at 
varying rates making it challenging for the clinician to determine the speed with which to present 
the material (Bullis et al., 2014). Further studies may help to tease out which types of individuals 
may be best served by group interventions and help determine optimized speeds of presentation 
to ensure learning across individuals with varying needs.  
Cross-Cultural literature.  In reviewing the recent literature on cross-cultural 
implementation of the UP, to date there exists only one research study on the efficacy of the UP 
for anxiety and depressive disorders in non-Western populations. This study was an open trial 
pilot study that examined the outcomes associated with implementing the UP with a Japanese 
clinical population (Ito, Horikoshi, Kato, Oe, 2016).  Seventeen participants with a mean age of 
35.18 completed approximately 18 sessions of treatment (Ito et al., 2016).  In order to maintain 
fidelity, the content of material remained consistent and the implementation remained the same 
as when used in the West, with the exception of translating the therapist manual and the patient 
workbook into Japanese. Illustrations to the patient workbook were also added in order to assist 
with the comprehension of certain concepts (Ito et al., 2016).  The results showed a significant 
decrease in anxiety and depressive symptoms, improved functioning, and enhanced quality of 
life both post-treatment and at three-month follow-up (Ito et al., 2016). This suggests that the UP 
may be applicable for use in non-Western countries and for emotional disorders (Ito et al., 2016). 
With regards to limitations to the study, it shares many of the same limitations as in the Ellard et 
al. (2010) studies. For example, the study is a pilot study rather than a randomized control trial 
(RCT) and has a very small sample size (n = 17), thereby producing a small effect size (Ito et al., 
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2016).  Nevertheless, this study’s findings form the basis for future RCT with larger sample sizes 
to ensure the stability of treatment effects cross-culturally. Future studies will help enhance our 
knowledge of what modules of UP may work best for different cultural groups, and what 
modifications, if any, might be helpful to undertake in cross-cultural applications to ensure 
cultural congruence and improve symptom reduction. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
	
  Upon reviewing the existing body of literature on the UP, areas for future focus and next 
steps for research have become apparent. Since the extant research is sparse, it will be important 
to conduct more RCTs with larger sample sizes in order to draw more comprehensive 
conclusions and to generate more confidence in the treatment effects that are found. In addition 
to increasing sample size, participant demographics need to be expanded to include greater age 
ranges and representation of diverse cultures to ensure generalizability of the findings. Moreover, 
future studies will need to consider adaptations of the UP to fit the different cultural backgrounds 
of patients.  In addition to representing cultural backgrounds, future research will need to expand 
its recruitment pool for study participants. To date, research on the UP has been implemented in 
a single setting: university centers for anxiety and related disorders. Expanding the settings to 
include community mental health centers, private practices, veterans administrations, and 
primary care clinics are indicated.  Another avenue for empirical exploration of the UP might be 
associated with treatment modalities. Most of the existing studies focus primarily on the efficacy 
of individual therapy.  An area of further study might include expanding delivery to groups, 
telemental health delivery, and internet-based therapy. With regards to study participants, the 
majority of subjects in the reviewed studies had primary diagnoses of anxiety disorders with 
comorbid mood disorders; therefore, participants with primary mood disorders with comorbid 
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anxiety disorders should be included in future research to examine if the studies will yield 
similar results.  Since worry and rumination are transdiagnostic and are implicated in anxiety and 
mood disorders, there is a need to study, in a more focused and specific manner, the impact of 
the UP on RNTs. However, because the majority of the abovementioned studies only examined 
general measures of anxiety, the impact on specific mechanisms and outcomes that characterize 
different fears (e.g., fears of social situations, or fears of physical sensations) still remains 
unclear. It will be important for future investigations of the UP to address questions regarding the 
performance of the UP outside of a research setting, the acceptability of a transdiagnositic 
treatment conceptualization among non research mental health providers, and the utility and 
feasibility of integrating the UP into our mental health care system 
Conclusion 
	
Overall, a transdiagnostic treatment approach seems positive. Analysis of the results 
across all studies that reported baseline and post-treatment data showed that the UP leads to large 
and significant reductions in both anxiety and depression, and moderate improvements in quality 
of life. Results at short-term follow-up (three to six months after treatment) also suggest that 
these positive outcomes are maintained following treatment. In addition to positive treatment 
outcomes, it must not be overlooked that a transdiagnostic protocol is also time and cost saving. 
Transdiagnostic treatments do not require detailed patient assessments and conceptualizations 
since the clinician is providing one treatment for a range of condition. The important theory that 
underlies UP, namely, that a structured intervention can be applied across diagnoses to address 
common underlying etiology that produces the overt symptoms of an illness; is a highly exciting 
development in the therapeutic literature and has significant impact for the ongoing fight to 
reduce stigma related to mental illness in general, as well as the self-stigma that certain specific 
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diagnostic labels can impose on the mentally ill that leads them to turn away from evidence-
based services that can aid them to live a meaningful and productive life. The future of UP and 
its multitudes of applications should be a priority for upcoming research investigations, and if 
supported by federal and private funding sources, may help this approach to be utilized more 
systematically across settings and with individuals with seemingly very different presentations, 
but who may all ultimately benefit from the techniques of UP.    
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Dear Colleague, 
 
Please find enclosed a copy of the Ruminative Responses Scale we have been using in 
much of our research on response styles for depression.  For full information on the 
psychometric qualities of this scale, please see Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003), 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27, 247-259. To obtain scores on this scale, simply sum the 
scores on the 22 items. 
 
I am often asked about cut-offs for determining whether an individual is a “ruminator” or 
not. We have not established any cut-offs; instead, I believe the appropriate use of this 
questionnaire is as a continuous measure. If you wish to select groups of “high” or “low” 
ruminators, I recommend using percentile cut-offs from your own sample (e.g., selecting people 
who score in the top 33% of your sample as “high” ruminators and people who score in the 
bottom 33% as “low” ruminators). 
 
The original Response Styles Questionnaire also included Distraction and Problem- 
Solving subscales.  Neither of these subscales has proven reliable or good predictors of 
depression change over time, so I am no longer distributing them. 
 
Please send me copies of reports of all studies in which you use any of these scales. 
Good luck in your research. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, Ph.D. 
Yale University 
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Rumination Scale 
 
People think and do many different things when they feel depressed.  Please read each of the 
items below and indicate whether you almost never, sometimes, often, or almost always think 
or do each one when you feel down, sad, or depressed. Please indicate what you generally 
do, not what you think you should do. 
 
1 almost never   2 sometimes 3 often 4 almost always 
 
 
1.  think about how alone you feel 
2.  think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of this” 
3.  think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness 
4.  think about how hard it is to concentrate 
5.  think “What am I doing to deserve this?” 
6.  think about how passive and unmotivated you feel. 
7.  analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed 
8.  think about how you don’t seem to feel anything anymore 
9.  think “Why can’t I get going?” 
10. think “Why do I always react this way?” 
11. go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way 
12. write down what you are thinking about and analyze it 
13. think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better 
14. think “I won’t be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this way.” 
15. think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?” 
16. think “Why can’t I handle things better?” 
17. think about how sad you feel. 
18. think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes 
19. think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything 
20. analyze your personality to try to understand why you are  depressed  
21. go someplace alone to think about your feelings 
22. think about how angry you are with yourself 
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Patient Name:                                               Date:   
 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) 
 
Instructions: Rate each of the following statements on a scale of 1 (“not at all typical of 
me”) to 5 (“very typical of me”). Please do not leave any items blank. 
 
	 Not at all 
typical of 
me 
	 	  Very 
typical 
of me 
1. If I do not have enough time to do 
everything, I do not worry about it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. My worries overwhelm me. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I do not tend to worry about things. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Many situations make me worry. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I know I should not worry about 
things, but I just cannot help it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. When I am under pressure I worry a lot. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. I am always worrying about something. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. As soon as I finish one task, I start to 
worry about everything else I have to 
do. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I never worry about anything. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. When there is nothing more I can do 
about a concern, I do not worry about it 
anymore. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I have been a worrier all my life. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I notice that I have been worrying 
about things. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Once I start worrying, I cannot stop. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I worry all the time. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. I worry about projects until they are all done. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Scoring the PSWQ 
 
 
In scoring the PSWQ, a value of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 is assigned to a response depending upon 
whether the item is worded positively or negatively.  The total score of the scale ranges from 16 
to 80. 
 
 
Items 1, 3, 8, 10, 11 are reverse scored as follows: 
• Very typical of me = 1 (circled 5 on the sheet) 
• Circled 4 on the sheet = 2 
• Circled 3 on the sheet = 3 
• Circled 2 on the sheet = 4 
• Not at all typical of me = 5 (circled 1 on the sheet) 
 
For items 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 the scoring is: 
• Not at all typical of me = 1 
• Ratings of 2, 3, and 4 are not transformed 
• Very typical of me = 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Citation: Meyer TJ, Miller ML, Metzger RL, Borkovec TD: Development and Validation of 
the Penn State Worry Questionnaire. Behaviour Research and Therapy 28:487-
495,1990 
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Graduate & Professional Schools Institutional Review Board 
 
 
July 25, 2017 
 
Katya Naman 
 
Project Title: Worry and Rumination: A Transdiagnostic Approach to Treatment   
Re: Research Study Not Subject to IRB Review 
 
Dear Ms. Naman: 
 
Thank you for submitting your application, Worry and Rumination: A Transdiagnostic Approach 
to Treatment, to Pepperdine University’s Graduate and Professional Schools Institutional Review 
Board (GPS IRB). After thorough review of your documents you have submitted, the GPS IRB 
has determined that your research is not subject to review because as you stated in your 
application your dissertation research study is a “critical review of the literature” and does not 
involve interaction with human subjects. If your dissertation research study is modified and thus 
involves interactions with human subjects it is at that time you will be required to submit an IRB 
application. 
 
Should you have additional questions, please contact the Kevin Collins Manager of Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) at 310-568-2305 or via email at kevin.collins@pepperdine.edu or Dr. Judy 
Ho, Faculty Chair of GPS IRB at gpsirb@pepperdine.edu. On behalf of the GPS IRB, I wish you 
continued success in this scholarly pursuit. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Kevin Collins 
Manager, Graduate and Professional Schools (GPS) Institutional Review Board 
 
	
cc:   Dr. Lee Kats, Vice Provost for Research and Strategic Initiatives 
Mr. Brett Leach, Compliance Attorney 
 Judy Ho, Faculty Advisor  
 
 
